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Abstract
Towards addressing ontological issues in design cognition research, this paper presents
the first generic classification of cognitive processes investigated in protocol studies on
conceptual design cognition. The classification is based on a systematic review of 47 studies
published over the past 30 years. Three viewpoints on the nature of design cognition are
outlined (search, exploration and design activities), highlighting considerable differences
in the concepts and terminology applied to describe cognition. To provide a more unified
view of the cognitive processes fundamentally under study, we map specific descriptions of
cognitive processes provided in protocol studies to more generic, established definitions in
the cognitive psychology literature. This reveals a set of 6 categories of cognitive process that
appear to be commonly studied and are therefore likely to be prevalent in conceptual design:
(1) long-term memory; (2) semantic processing; (3) visual perception; (4) mental imagery
processing; (5) creative output production and (6) executive functions. The categories and
their constituent processes are formalised in the generic classification. The classification
provides the basis for a generic, shared ontology of cognitive processes in design that is
conceptually and terminologically consistent with the ontology of cognitive psychology
and neuroscience. In addition, the work highlights 6 key avenues for future empirical
research: (1) the role of episodic and semantic memory; (2) consistent definitions of
semantic processes; (3) the role of sketching from alternative theoretical perspectives on
perception and mental imagery; (4) the role of working memory; (5) the meaning and
nature of synthesis and (6) unidentified cognitive processes implicated in conceptual design
elsewhere in the literature.
Key words: cognitive processes, conceptual design, design cognition, protocol analysis,
psychology
1. Introduction
The majority of empirical design cognition studies published over the past 25
years have focused on the early, relatively ambiguous stages of the design process
known as conceptual design (McNeill et al. 1998; Goel 2014; Dinar et al. 2015).
Generating a high number of ideas during conceptual design is believed to result
in lower cost and higher quality products (Jin & Benami 2010). Furthermore,
conceptual design tasks are typically associated with creativity and the generation
of novel ideas, which are considered fundamental to innovation and societal
progress (Li et al. 2007). Thus, conceptual design may have a significant impact
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upon design performance later in the design process, as well as broader social
and economic processes and systems. However, in spite of the relative importance
of conceptual design and the considerable body of empirical work on the topic,
there remains a lack of clarity regarding the nature of the cognitive processes
involved in conceptual design tasks (Jin&Benami 2010). Kim&Ryu (2014, p. 519)
point to the involvement of ‘perception, problem solving, reasoning and thinking
about the design’, but acknowledge that there is a need for thorough research ‘to
better understand designers’ internal cognitive processes’. More generally, Dorst &
Cross (2001, p. 425) note that the internal mechanisms involved in creative idea
generation are ‘mysterious (and often mystified)’.
A range of methods may be applied in the study of conceptual design
cognition. These include case studies, involving in-depth study of individual
design projects (e.g. Taborda et al. 2012; Buys &Mulder 2014) and controlled tests
of cognitive performance during predefined design tasks (e.g. McKoy et al. 2001;
Viswanathan & Linsey 2012), as well as interviews and questionnaires (Dinar
et al. 2015). However, the method of protocol analysis may be viewed as the most
prolific. In protocol analysis, the nature of a designer’s cognitive processing at
various points during a design task is inferred from verbal self-reports gathered
during or following task performance, as well as design outputs produced and
observations of physical behaviours such as gestures and other motor actions
(Ericsson & Simon 1984; van Someren et al. 1994; Gero & Tang 2001). Whilst
protocol analysis has been widely criticised with respect to issues of subjectivity
and reliability (Ericsson & Simon 1984; Lloyd et al. 1995; Suwa & Tversky 1997;
Sarkar & Chakrabarti 2014), it has nonetheless become regarded as ‘the most
likely method (perhaps the only method) to bring out into the open the somewhat
mysterious cognitive abilities of designers’ (Cross 2001, p. 80). This view is shared
by several authors in the literature, including e.g. van Someren et al. (1994), Lloyd
et al. (1995) and Sarkar & Chakrabarti (2014).
To address the need for greater clarity regarding the nature of the cognitive
processes that may be involved in conceptual design, we carried out a systematic
review of 47 protocol studies on conceptual design cognition published over
the past 30 years (Hay et al. under review). A key finding of this review
is that although broad commonalities may be detected, protocol studies vary
considerably with respect to the concepts and terminology applied to describe
cognition. To some degree, these differencesmay be explained by variations in the
major paradigms underlying design cognition research generally, i.e. the problem
solving and reflective paradigms as discussed at length by Dorst & Dijkhuis
(1995). Nonetheless, the inconsistencies make it difficult to rationalise the range
of cognitive processes investigated in protocol studies on conceptual design. In
turn, this obscures the fundamental nature of the processes under study, making
it difficult to provide a unified view of the field and to identify general avenues
for future work. The use of terms that are virtually meaningless in cognitive
psychology further adds to these difficulties, e.g. seeing as (Goldschmidt 1991),
unexpected discovery (Suwa et al. 2000) and cognitive action (Suwa et al. 1998).
Overall, these observations may be considered to highlight a lack of common
models and theories of design cognition, a view that is supported to an extent
by Dinar et al. (2015). More fundamentally, however, we suggest that the review
findings raise important ontological questions for design cognition research: what
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cognitive processes actually exist within this domain, and how should they be
defined and organised for study?
In this paper, we explore the ontological challenges highlighted by our
systematic review, and present the first generic classification of cognitive processes
investigated in protocol studies on conceptual design cognition. To develop this
classification, we mapped specific descriptions of cognitive processes studied by
authors in our systematic review sample to more generic, established definitions
provided in the cognitive psychology literature. This exercise revealed 6 categories
of cognitive process that appear to be commonly investigated and are therefore
likely to be prevalent in conceptual design: (1) long-term memory; (2) semantic
processing; (3) visual perception; (4) mental imagery processing; (5) creative
output production and (6) executive functions. Each category is comprised of
several processes, which are elaborated in Section 4. In addition, the classification
and its development highlight 6 key avenues for future empirical work on cognitive
processes in conceptual design:
1. clarifying the nature and role of episodic and semanticmemory in conceptual
design;
2. developing more consistent definitions of the types of semantic processes
involved in conceptual design;
3. considering and critiquing alternative perspectives on the similarities
between visual perception and mental imagery processing, and in turn
investigating the role of sketching from multiple theoretical perspectives
to arrive at a more definitive position;
4. investigating the role of working memory in conceptual design, including
the use of both the visuo-spatial sketchpad for mental imagery and the
phonological loop for verbal design information;
5. clarifying the meaning of the term ‘synthesis’ in conceptual design and the
nature of the process(es) it denotes;
6. expanding the classification as a whole to include any cognitive processes
not identified from the reviewed studies, but implicated in conceptual design
elsewhere in the literature (e.g. learning).
The classification may be considered to provide a more unified view of
conceptual design cognition and the key avenues for future research on cognitive
processes in this area. In addition, we suggest that it provides a starting point for
the development of a generic, shared ontology of cognitive processes in design
(discussed at length in Section 5). The remainder of the paper is organised as
follows. An overview of the systematic review approach and sample characteristics
is firstly provided in Section 2. In Section 3, we summarise the range of cognitive
processes identified through the review in terms of three viewpoints on design
cognition emerging from our sample: search (V1), exploration (V2) and activities
(V3). In Section 4, descriptions of cognitive processes associated with each
viewpoint are mapped to the cognitive psychology literature, before the generic
classification is presented and elaborated. In Section 5, we discuss the implications
of the work for the broader design cognition community and areas for future
research. The paper concludes with a summary of the work in Section 6.
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Table 1. Search terms applied in the systematic review (Hay et al. under review),
under review)
← AND→
Domain Participants Conceptual design Cognition
Design Architect OR Creativ* OR Cognit* OR
Architects OR Designing OR Idea OR
Designer OR Drafting OR Ideas OR
Designers OR Drawing OR Mental OR
Engineer OR Ideat* OR Percept OR
Engineers OR Imagery OR Visual*
Engineering Sketch*
2. Systematic review approach and sample
As noted in Section 1, the work reported herein is based on the findings of a
systematic review of 47 protocol studies on conceptual design cognition, guided
by the following research question (Hay et al. under review):What is our current
understanding of the cognitive processes involved in conceptual design tasks carried
out by individual designers? We covered the domains of architectural design,
engineering design and product design engineering. The review was conducted
by two design researchers (RDes1 and RDes2) with expertise in product design
engineering, receiving input from a cognitive neuroscience researcher (RCog) as
required. Our approach was informed by the PRISMA statement (outlined in
Moher et al. 2009), providing generic guidance with respect to recommended
activities for a rigorous and transparent systematic review. An overview of the
article selection process, inclusion criteria, sample characteristics and synthesis
process is provided below.
Firstly, to identify candidate articles for inclusion, we searched major
engineering/design and psychology databases (Compendex, Design and Applied
Arts Index, Technology Research Database, Embase, PsycINFO and PubMed)
between 27th March 2015 and 3rd April 2015. These searches returned a total
of 6796 articles, reduced to 4996 through removal of duplicates. Search terms
are presented in Table 1, and were applied largely across the title and abstract
fields. The broadest time frame permitted by each database was applied. Following
de-duplication, we screened the abstracts of the remaining articles for relevance
with respect to the research question. At this stage, we decided to focus the review
on protocol studies alone, excluding other types of research such as case studies,
controlled experiments and surveys. This was largely motivated by the view that
protocol analysis is the most capable method for revealing cognitive processes in
design (Section 1). To maximise coverage, further candidate articles were then
identified by searching protocol study reference lists and conducting follow-up
database searches with additional terms relating to protocol analysis (9th October
2015). A total of 103 protocol studies were carried forward.
Next, we assessed the fitness of each study for answering our research
question with respect to 6 inclusion criteria: (1) must be published in English;
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(2) conference papers must be published post-2005; (3) must report original
research; (4) must focus on individual designers rather than group-based design
tasks; (5) must focus on a conceptual design task in the domains of architectural
design, engineering design or product design engineering and (6) must identify
cognitive processes involved in conceptual design (Hay et al. under review). Note
that articles obtained through initial, reference list and follow-up searches were
all consistently assessed. A total of 47 articles were included in the final sample
(denoted by * in the reference list at the end of this paper), with the following
characteristics (Hay et al. under review):
• Publication year: 1979 (Akin 1979) to 2015 (e.g. Yu et al. 2015), with 52.3%
of studies published in the last decade.
• Study type: full protocol studies (76.6%) and analyses of existing protocol
data (23.4%).
• Sample size: 1 to 36 participants (∼350 overall), with an average of 7 and a
median of 6 per study (SD= 6.30).
• Participants: practicing designers and undergraduate, Master’s and PhD
design students with experience levels of 0 to 38 years.
• Design tasks: 45 distinct tasks, with 44.4% architectural design, 42.2%
product design engineering and 13.3% engineering design.
• Types of data gathered: concurrent verbalisations (68.1%); retrospective
verbalisations (23.4%); combined concurrent and retrospective verbali-
sations (8.5%); video of behaviour (84.4%) and physical sketches (51.1%).
• Length of verbal protocols: 15 to 600 minutes.
Following consolidation of the review sample, the full text of each article was
reviewed by RDes1 and RDes2 in order to extract and synthesise descriptions
of cognitive processes provided by authors. This was conducted in an iterative
fashion, with categories and processes being continually refined through
discussion (with RCog) and classification in a common synthesis matrix as
they emerged from the review sample. Our interpretation of what constitutes
a cognitive process is based on the following definition provided by Poldrack et al.
(2011, p. 3) in the cognitive science literature: cognitive processes are ‘entities
that transform or operate on mental representations’. Mental representations are
defined as ‘mental entities that stand in relation to some physical entity [. . .] or
abstract concept (which could be another mental entity)’. The synthesis process
also revealed persistent differences in the way that cognition is described and
formalised across different studies, which were interpreted as reflecting the
viewpoints of search (V1), exploration (V2) and design activities (V3) introduced
in Section 1. As a means to structure the review findings, we assigned each article
to one of these viewpoints based on relevant keywords and interpretation of the
work against the broader literature on search, exploration and activities.
3. Viewpoints on conceptual design cognition
Three major viewpoints on design cognition were found to emerge from our
systematic review sample: (V1) design as search; (V2) design as exploration and
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(V3) design activities. V1 and V2 are explored in detail in Hay et al. (under
review), whilst V3 is briefly conveyed.We identified a range of cognitive processes
investigated in studies associated with each viewpoint. In this respect, the
viewpoints overlap to some degree; that is, certain processes may be studied by
authors aligning with different viewpoints (an observation that shall become
clearer in Section 4). To provide a basis for mapping descriptions of cognitive
processes provided in design protocol studies to the cognitive psychology
literature in Section 4, each of the viewpoints is outlined in the following
sub-sections. Whilst the key points are covered, interested readers are referred
to Hay et al. (under review) for a considerably more in-depth exploration and
discussion of V1 and V2 in particular.
The full set of 35 cognitive processes identified from our review sample is
summarised in Table 3 in Appendix A. It should be noted that several of these
processes are described by authors as involving multiple related sub-processes,
which may also be viewed as cognitive in nature. Throughout the following
sub-sections, the 35 processes listed in Table 3 are italicised and followed by
a discussion on any sub-processes that may contribute to their execution. The
key elements of this discussion are also summarised in Table 3. Note that the
comprehensiveness of the identified processes and our resulting classification is
discussed in Section 5.2.5.
3.1. Design as search
The first viewpoint on design cognition (V1) considers designing to constitute a
goal-directed search process transforming knowledge states in a problem space. In
the context of design as search, the designer is typically viewed as an information
processing system (IPS) operating within some objective reality (Chan 1990;
Stauffer & Ullman 1991; Dorst & Dijkhuis 1995). During designing, information
is retrieved from long-termmemory and activated inworkingmemory (Chan 1990;
Stauffer & Ullman 1991), where it is then transformed from input to output states
via the execution of elementary information processes termed operators (Stauffer
& Ullman 1991). Operators are argued to be stored within schemas in long-term
memory, i.e. networks of knowledge units encompassing both declarative and
procedural knowledge about design problems (Chan 1990; Ball et al. 2004). The
design state may be transformed laterally, i.e. from one idea to a different idea,
or vertically, i.e. from one idea to a more detailed version of the same idea (Goel
1995; Chen & Zhao 2006).
A search processmay be viewed as a sequence of state transformations effected
by the execution of operators. The search begins with a problem state, i.e.
knowledge of some problem to be solved, and proceeds through intermediate
design states until the goal (i.e. desired) state is reached and the problem is
solved (Chan 1990; Stauffer & Ullman 1991). The search process is delimited by
a problem space, constituting a representation of the designer’s task environment.
In addition to knowledge of the problem and goal state, the problem space
encompasses knowledge of all possible intermediate design states (Newell &
Simon 1972; Chan 1990; Stauffer & Ullman 1991; Goel 1995).
Design problems are generally considered to have a large problem space owing
to their ill-defined nature; however, implementing constraints can reduce the size
of the space to be searched (Chan 1990; Goel 1995). The search process is further
managed through the definition and implementation of design goals, specifying
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desired states to be attained (Akin 1979; Chan 1990; Stauffer & Ullman 1991).
In this respect, several authors suggest that the search process may be preceded
by, and/or interrupted by, another process known as problem structuring. During
problem structuring, information about the problem is gathered, requirements
are formulated, goals are set and prioritised, and constraints are established (Akin
1984; Chan 1990; Goel 1995). Restructuring the problem results in changes to
the nature and/or structure of goals, constraints and requirements (Chan 1990).
Related processes include: problem decomposition, i.e. the process of breaking
down a design problem into sub-problems through the specification of sub-goals
(Lloyd & Scott 1994; Liikkanen & Perttula 2009; Lee et al. 2014); and problem
reframing, i.e. the process of identifying restrictive frames of reference and
specifying new frames conducive to solving the design problem (Akin & Akin
1996).
Several authors may also be observed to study reasoning processes in a search
context. For instance, Eckersley (1988) and Lloyd & Scott (1994) highlight the
role of deductive and inductive inference in design problem solving, i.e. the process
by which a logical judgement is made on the basis of pre-existing information
(e.g. prior knowledge or previous judgements) rather than direct observations. In
addition, Ball et al. (2004) examined the use of analogical and case-based reasoning
in design problem solving, where information about known concepts and past
design problems is used to understand newly encountered concepts and problems,
respectively.
3.2. Design as exploration
In addition to a search process operating within a single knowledge space,
designing may also be viewed as an exploratory process operating between a
problem and a solution space. During design as exploration (V2), actions taken
in the solution space (e.g. idea generation) are considered to influence actions
taken in the problem space (e.g. problem structuring) and vice versa. Interactions
between the two spaces may add new variables into each (e.g. new design
requirements and potential solutions). In this way, design problems are considered
to evolve alongside solutions (Maher & Tang 2003; Jin & Chusilp 2006; Yu et al.
2014). This view is formalised in the co-evolution model of design (Dorst &
Cross 2001; Maher & Tang 2003; Yu et al. 2014), where design is described as
a co-evolutionary process that ‘explores the spaces of problem requirements and
design solutions iteratively’. Design concepts in the solution space are evaluated
and evolved on the basis of requirements in the problem space, and vice versa.
A significant number of protocol studies on exploratory design focus on what
may be termed sketch-based design exploration. Here, a designer’s understanding
of a problem is considered to be affected by what they draw, perceive and interpret
in their sketches, and vice versa. This may also be described as situatedness (Gero
& Kannengiesser 2004). The concept of situatedness is reflected in studies on the
process of visual reasoning, an area largely pioneered by Goldschmidt (1991).
Goldschmidt argues that during sketching tasks, designers continually switch
between two modes of reasoning: (i) seeing as (SA), i.e. the process of proposing
properties and attributes that a design could possess based on analogies between
sketch elements and mental representations (e.g. concepts and past experiences);
and (ii) seeing that (ST), i.e. the process of reasoning about design decisions
relating to these proposals and how they might affect design requirements. Suwa
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et al. (1998) study a process that appears similar to SA, termed re-interpretation.
That is, assigning new functions to parts of a design through the interpretation of
visuo-spatial elements and relations in sketches. More recently, visual reasoning
was modelled as the continual interaction of drawing, seeing (i.e. perceptual) and
imagining (i.e. mental imagery) processes by Park & Kim (2007).
The concept of situatedness is also reflected in the work of Suwa et al.
(1998, 2000), who examine the cognitive actions of architects. Cognitive actions
may be viewed as a set of interdependent cognitive processes argued to be
involved in sketching, spanning three different levels of information processing:
physical actions at the sensory level, perceptual actions at the perceptual level, and
functional and conceptual actions at the semantic level. Suwa et al. (2000) suggest
that during sketching, designersmay execute a particular type of perceptual action
termed unexpected discovery, where a designer perceives a previously unseen
feature, relation, or space in their sketches. Instances of unexpected discovery
were found to be correlated with a process termed situated requirements invention,
where new design goals are set up, generalised and carried through the design
process as new design requirements. Thus, the designer’s understanding of the
problem is considered to be affected by changes in perceptual input during
sketching.
3.3. Design activities
A final viewpoint that may be adopted on design cognition is that of design
activities (V3), with several authors examining activity patterns and relationships
in addition to the nature of design activities per se. Note that the former is
beyond the scope of this paper and therefore not discussed here. In design
research, an activity may be generally defined as a goal-directed action, where
an action is the act of transforming some entity from an input state to an
output state (Sim & Duffy 2003; Boyle et al. 2009). Design activities may involve
physical actions transforming external entities (e.g. motor actions of the arms and
hands transforming sketches), and/or cognitive processes transforming internal
entities (e.g. mental imagery processes transforming mental images, ideas, etc.).
The design activities discussed in this section are considered from a cognitive
perspective, i.e. focusing on the cognitive processes involved rather than physical
actions. Five key design activities were identified fromour review sample: problem
analysis, concept generation, synthesis, concept evaluation and decision making.
Firstly, problem analysis involves understanding the design problem, setting
goals, and defining constraints and requirements (Jin & Chusilp 2006; Kruger
& Cross 2006; Jin & Benami 2010). Jin & Chusilp (2006, p. 30) suggest that
when designing, ‘the problem definition may be elaborated or revised’, resulting
in changes to constraints and requirements’. Problem analysis may be viewed
as analogous to the process of problem structuring discussed in the context of
design as search in Section 3.1 (Liikkanen & Perttula 2009), and is examined by
several authors in the context of studies on design activity patterns (e.g. McNeill
et al. 1998; Kruger & Cross 2006; Jin & Benami 2010; Lee et al. 2014). The
related processes of identifying, exploring, clarifying, and prioritising constraints
and requirements – that is, themanagement of constraints and requirements – have
also received attention from numerous authors (Kim et al. 2005, 2006; Lane &
Seery 2011; Daly et al. 2012).
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Secondly, we found concept generation to be interpreted in two different ways
by authors: the generation of ideas or partial solutions followed by the synthesis
of these into more mature or complete concepts (Jin & Chusilp 2006); or simply
the generation of ideas, with synthesis treated as a separate process (Jin & Chusilp
2006; Kruger & Cross 2006). Concept generation appears to involve the retrieval
of representations from memory as a basic process (Jin & Chusilp 2006; Jin &
Benami 2010; Lane & Seery 2011), which may occur in response to ‘perceptual
stimulation’ (Jin & Chusilp 2006, p. 30). The association of representations is also
positioned as a basic process by Jin & Benami (2010), and evidence supporting
the involvement of associative reasoning processes in concept generation and
synthesis (e.g. analogical and case-based reasoning as discussed in Section 3.1)
has been identified by a number of other authors (e.g. Chiu 2003; Kim et al.
2010; Daly et al. 2012; Kim & Ryu 2014; Yu & Gero 2015). The transformation
of internal representations (e.g. images and concepts) during concept generation is
also considered by Jin & Benami (2010), Lane & Seery (2011) and Leblebici-Basar
& Altarriba (2013).
Finally, concept evaluation refers to the process of assessing concepts against
constraints, criteria and design requirements defined during problem analysis
(McNeill et al. 1998; Jin &Chusilp 2006; Kruger &Cross 2006; Jin & Benami 2010;
Lee et al. 2014). Evaluation serves to ensure that a concept is ‘relevant, useful and
good’, with relevance and usefulness determined against ‘design requirements and
constraints’, and goodness against ‘design criteria’ (Jin &Chusilp 2006, p. 31). Kim
& Ryu (2014) were additionally found to investigate the closely related process of
decision making, i.e. the process of selecting a concept to be taken forward for
further development from a range of evaluated alternatives. Two sub-processes
involved in evaluation were also considered by several authors: (i) comparing, e.g.
comparing two concepts, comparing concepts against criteria, etc. (Kim & Ryu
2014) and (ii) judging, where judgements may be based on subjective aspects such
as value (Kruger & Cross 2006), aesthetics (Chandrasekera et al. 2013) and affect
(Kim&Ryu 2014), or objective criteria (Chiu 2003; Kruger&Cross 2006; Lee et al.
2014).
4. A generic classification of cognitive processes
It may be seen from the material covered in Section 3 that protocol studies vary
considerably with respect to the concepts and terminology used to describe design
cognition. This makes it difficult to rationalise the range of cognitive processes
fundamentally under investigation across different protocol studies. To gain a
clearer view in this respect, wemapped specific descriptions of cognitive processes
provided by authors in our sample to more generic, established definitions
provided in the cognitive psychology literature in a bottom-up fashion. That
is, by interpreting the key characteristics of cognitive processes described by
design authors, and then identifying processes with similar characteristics in
the cognitive psychology literature. We then grouped the latter into 6 categories
according to ontological conventions conveyed in psychology articles, books, and
formal frameworks (e.g., Poldrack 2009; Poldrack et al. 2011): (1) long-term
memory; (2) semantic processing; (3) visual perception; (4) mental imagery
processing; (5) executive functions and (6) creative output production. These
categories, and the processes they are comprised of (Table 2), are formalised in
a generic classification of cognitive processes in conceptual design presented in
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Figure 1. Generic classification of cognitive processes involved in conceptual design.
Figure 1. As shown in Table 2, the 6 categories appear to be commonly investigated
across multiple viewpoints and are therefore likely to be prevalent in conceptual
design.
Drawing from the psychology literature, the cognitive processes included in
the classification and their role in conceptual design tasks are outlined in the sub-
sections below as follows: (i) long-termmemory and semantic processing (Section
4.1); (ii) visual perception and mental imagery (Section 4.2) and (iii) higher-
order processes involved in creative output production and executive functioning
(Section 4.3). Note that future work relating to individual processes is discussed
in Section 5.
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ie
va
l
of
pr
ev
io
us
ly
en
co
un
te
re
d
de
sig
n
pr
ob
le
m
s
in
ca
se
-b
as
ed
re
as
on
in
g
(B
al
le
ta
l.
20
04
).
V
1 P
10
/V
3 P
9
Se
m
an
tic
re
tr
ie
va
l
Re
tr
ie
va
lo
ft
yp
es
of
pr
od
uc
ta
nd
fu
nc
tio
n
du
rin
g
co
nc
ep
tg
en
er
at
io
n
(Ji
n
&
Be
na
m
i2
01
0)
.
V
1 P
9/
V
3 P
8
Se
m
an
tic
pr
oc
es
sin
g
In
te
rp
re
tin
g
m
ea
ni
ng
s
co
nv
ey
ed
by
sti
m
ul
i
Se
ei
ng
as
,i
.e.
th
e
pr
oc
es
so
fp
ro
po
sin
g
pr
op
er
tie
s/
at
tr
ib
ut
es
th
at
a
de
sig
n
co
ul
d
po
ss
es
sb
as
ed
on
m
et
ap
ho
rs
an
d
an
al
og
ie
s.
V
2 P
3
In
te
rp
re
tin
g
an
d
as
so
ci
at
in
g
re
pr
es
en
ta
tio
ns
Re
-in
te
rp
re
ta
tio
n,
i.e
.t
he
pr
oc
es
so
fa
ss
ig
ni
ng
ne
w
fu
nc
tio
ns
to
pa
rt
so
fa
de
sig
n
th
ro
ug
h
th
e
in
te
rp
re
ta
tio
n
of
vi
su
o-
sp
at
ia
le
le
m
en
ts
an
d
re
la
tio
ns
in
sk
et
ch
es
.
V
2 P
4
Se
m
an
tic
as
so
ci
at
io
n
In
fe
re
nc
e
op
er
at
or
,
i.e
.
an
ele
m
en
ta
ry
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
pr
oc
es
s
th
at
hy
po
th
es
ise
sn
ew
re
la
tio
ns
be
tw
ee
n
sy
m
bo
ls
(A
ki
n
19
79
).
V
1 P
5
A
ss
oc
ia
tio
n
of
re
pr
es
en
ta
tio
ns
,
i.e
.
fo
rm
in
g
m
en
ta
l
re
la
tio
ns
be
tw
ee
n
re
pr
es
en
ta
tio
ns
re
tr
ie
ve
d
fro
m
m
em
or
y.
V
3 P
6
(c
on
tin
ue
d
on
ne
xt
pa
ge
)
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Ta
bl
e
2.
(c
on
tin
ue
d) Se
m
an
tic
ca
te
go
ris
at
io
n
G
en
er
al
isa
tio
n
op
er
at
or
,
i.e
.
an
ele
m
en
ta
ry
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
pr
oc
es
s
th
at
as
so
ci
at
es
at
tr
ib
ut
es
w
ith
su
pr
a-
sy
m
bo
ls
(A
ki
n
19
79
).
V
1 P
5
Th
e
an
al
ys
is
an
d
in
te
rp
re
ta
tio
n
sta
ge
s
in
th
e
pr
oc
es
s
of
se
ei
ng
,
i.e
.
id
en
tif
yi
ng
th
ea
ttr
ib
ut
es
of
ap
er
ce
iv
ed
ob
je
ct
,a
nd
us
in
g
th
is
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
to
ca
te
go
ris
et
he
pe
rc
ei
ve
d
ob
je
ct
ba
se
d
on
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
sto
re
d
in
m
em
or
y.
V
2 P
5
Vi
su
al
pe
rc
ep
tio
n
Vi
su
al
pe
rc
ep
tio
n
ge
ne
ra
lly
D
at
a
in
pu
to
pe
ra
to
r,
i.e
.a
n
ele
m
en
ta
ry
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
pr
oc
es
sd
ea
lin
g
w
ith
aff
er
en
ts
en
so
ry
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
fro
m
th
ee
xt
er
na
lw
or
ld
(C
ha
n
19
90
).
V
1 P
5
Pe
rc
ei
vi
ng
an
d
at
te
nd
in
g
to
re
pr
es
en
ta
tio
ns
D
ev
elo
pi
ng
an
d
se
ns
in
g
pe
rc
ep
ts
Th
ep
er
ce
iv
in
gs
ta
ge
in
th
ep
ro
ce
ss
of
se
ei
ng
,i.
e.
id
en
tif
yi
ng
an
d
co
m
bi
ni
ng
pr
im
iti
ve
vi
su
al
ele
m
en
ts,
an
d
co
ns
ci
ou
sly
se
ns
in
g
th
e
re
su
lti
ng
vi
su
o-
sp
at
ia
lr
ep
re
se
nt
at
io
n.
V
2 P
5
Vi
su
al
at
te
nt
io
n
At
te
nd
in
g
to
vi
su
al
fe
at
ur
es
of
sk
et
ch
ele
m
en
ts
(p
er
ce
pt
ua
l
co
gn
iti
ve
ac
tio
n)
.
V
2 P
10
At
te
nd
in
gt
o
sp
at
ia
lr
el
at
io
ns
am
on
gs
ke
tc
h
ele
m
en
ts
(p
er
ce
pt
ua
lc
og
ni
tiv
e
ac
tio
n)
.
Pe
rc
ep
tu
al
or
ga
ni
sa
tio
n
O
rg
an
isi
ng
or
co
m
pa
rin
g
sk
et
ch
ele
m
en
ts
(p
er
ce
pt
ua
lc
og
ni
tiv
ea
ct
io
n)
.
V
2 P
10
Pe
rc
ep
tu
al
re
-
or
ga
ni
sa
tio
n
U
ne
xp
ec
te
d
di
sc
ov
er
y,
i.e
.
th
e
pr
oc
es
s
of
pe
rc
ei
vi
ng
a
vi
su
o-
sp
at
ia
l
fe
at
ur
e/
re
la
tio
n
in
a
sk
et
ch
th
at
w
as
no
t
in
te
nt
io
na
lly
cr
ea
te
d
an
d
is
th
er
ef
or
eu
ne
xp
ec
te
d.
Th
is
in
clu
de
st
he
di
sc
ov
er
y
of
:(
i)
th
es
ha
pe
,s
iz
e,
or
te
xt
ur
e
of
a
sk
et
ch
ele
m
en
t;
(ii
)a
sp
at
ia
lo
ro
rg
an
isa
tio
na
lr
el
at
io
n
am
on
g
ele
m
en
ts;
an
d
(ii
i)
a
sp
ac
e
th
at
ex
ist
si
n
be
tw
ee
n
ele
m
en
ts
(fi
gu
re
-g
ro
un
d
re
ve
rs
al
).
V
2 P
13
(c
on
tin
ue
d
on
ne
xt
pa
ge
)
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Ta
bl
e
2.
(c
on
tin
ue
d)
M
en
ta
l
im
ag
er
y
pr
oc
es
sin
g
G
en
er
at
in
g
im
ag
es
Th
eg
en
er
at
io
n
sta
ge
in
th
ep
ro
ce
ss
of
im
ag
in
in
g
du
rin
g
vi
su
al
re
as
on
in
g.
V
2 P
6
Pr
od
uc
in
g
an
d
m
od
ify
in
g
re
pr
es
en
ta
tio
ns
M
ai
nt
ai
ni
ng
im
ag
es
Th
em
ai
nt
en
an
ce
sta
ge
in
th
ep
ro
ce
ss
of
im
ag
in
in
gd
ur
in
gv
isu
al
re
as
on
in
g.
Tr
an
sfo
rm
in
g
im
ag
es
Th
e
tr
an
sfo
rm
at
io
n
sta
ge
in
th
e
pr
oc
es
s
of
im
ag
in
in
g
du
rin
g
vi
su
al
re
as
on
in
g.
Tr
an
sfo
rm
at
io
n
of
re
pr
es
en
ta
tio
ns
,
i.e
.
th
e
pr
oc
es
s
of
al
te
rin
g
m
en
ta
l
re
pr
es
en
ta
tio
ns
re
tr
ie
ve
d
fro
m
lo
ng
-te
rm
m
em
or
y
to
pr
od
uc
e
ne
w
re
pr
es
en
ta
tio
ns
.
V
3 P
7
Ex
ec
ut
iv
e
fu
nc
tio
ns
Pr
ob
le
m
str
uc
tu
rin
g
Th
e
pr
oc
es
so
fd
ef
in
in
g
th
e
de
sig
n
pr
ob
le
m
pr
io
rt
o
or
du
rin
g
th
e
se
ar
ch
fo
ra
so
lu
tio
n.
V
1 P
2
Pl
an
ni
ng
,
m
on
ito
rin
g,
an
d
se
le
ct
in
g
D
ec
om
po
sit
io
n,
i.e
.t
he
pr
oc
es
s
of
br
ea
ki
ng
a
de
sig
n
pr
ob
le
m
do
w
n
in
to
su
b-
pr
ob
le
m
st
hr
ou
gh
th
es
pe
ci
fic
at
io
n
of
su
b-
go
al
s.
V
1 P
3
G
oa
ld
ef
in
iti
on
op
er
at
or
,i
.e.
an
ele
m
en
ta
ry
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
pr
oc
es
sd
ef
in
in
g
go
al
so
rs
ub
-g
oa
ls.
V
1 P
5
St
ru
ct
ur
in
g/
re
str
uc
tu
rin
g
a
pr
ob
le
m
ba
se
d
on
th
e
ou
tc
om
es
of
ac
tio
ns
ta
ke
n
to
de
ve
lo
p
an
d
ev
al
ua
te
as
ol
ut
io
n
du
rin
g
co
-e
vo
lu
tio
na
ry
de
sig
n.
V
2 P
1
Se
tti
ng
up
go
al
s(
co
nc
ep
tu
al
co
gn
iti
ve
ac
tio
n)
.
V
2 P
12
Si
tu
at
ed
in
ve
nt
io
n
of
de
sig
n
re
qu
ire
m
en
ts,
i.e
.t
he
pr
oc
es
s
of
de
ve
lo
pi
ng
ne
w
de
sig
n
re
qu
ire
m
en
ts
ba
se
d
on
w
ha
ti
sp
er
ce
iv
ed
in
sk
et
ch
es
.
V
2 P
14
Pr
ob
le
m
an
al
ys
is,
i.e
.t
he
pr
oc
es
s
of
ch
ar
ac
te
ris
in
g
an
d
str
uc
tu
rin
g
th
e
de
sig
n
pr
ob
le
m
by
se
tti
ng
go
al
sa
nd
de
fin
in
gc
on
str
ai
nt
sa
nd
re
qu
ire
m
en
ts.
V
3 P
1
(c
on
tin
ue
d
on
ne
xt
pa
ge
)
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Ta
bl
e
2.
(c
on
tin
ue
d)
Id
en
tif
yi
ng
,
ex
pl
or
in
g,
cla
rif
yi
ng
,
an
d
pr
io
rit
isi
ng
co
ns
tr
ai
nt
s
an
d
re
qu
ire
m
en
ts.
V
3 P
2
Ev
al
ua
tin
g
co
nc
ep
ts
C
om
pa
re
op
er
at
or
,i
.e.
an
ele
m
en
ta
ry
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
pr
oc
es
sd
et
er
m
in
in
gt
he
co
m
pa
tib
ili
ty
of
pr
op
os
al
sa
ga
in
st
co
ns
tr
ai
nt
s(
St
au
ffe
r&
U
llm
an
19
91
).
V
1 P
5
Ev
al
ua
tin
gs
ol
ut
io
ns
ag
ai
ns
tp
ro
bl
em
re
qu
ire
m
en
ts
du
rin
gc
o-
ev
ol
ut
io
na
ry
de
sig
n.
V
2 P
1
Pr
ef
er
en
tia
la
nd
ae
sth
et
ic
ev
al
ua
tio
n
(c
on
ce
pt
ua
lc
og
ni
tiv
ea
ct
io
n)
.
V
2 P
12
C
on
ce
pt
ev
al
ua
tio
n,
i.e
.t
he
pr
oc
es
s
of
as
se
ss
in
g
co
nc
ep
ts
ag
ai
ns
td
es
ig
n
re
qu
ire
m
en
ts,
co
ns
tr
ai
nt
s,
an
d
ot
he
r
cr
ite
ria
to
de
te
rm
in
e
th
e
ex
te
nt
to
w
hi
ch
th
ec
on
ce
pt
sf
ul
fil
th
ec
rit
er
ia
.
V
3 P
10
C
om
pa
rin
g,
i.e
.t
he
pr
oc
es
so
fc
om
pa
rin
g
co
nc
ep
ts
ag
ai
ns
td
es
ig
n
cr
ite
ria
or
ot
he
rc
on
ce
pt
s.
V
3 P
11
Ju
dg
in
g,
i.e
.t
he
pr
oc
es
so
fm
ak
in
g
ju
dg
em
en
ts
ab
ou
tc
on
ce
pt
so
n
th
eb
as
is
of
va
lu
e,
ae
sth
et
ic
s,
aff
ec
t,
or
ob
je
ct
iv
ec
rit
er
ia
.
V
3 P
12
D
ec
isi
on
m
ak
in
g
Ac
ce
pt
op
er
at
or
,
i.e
.
an
ele
m
en
ta
ry
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
pr
oc
es
s
ad
di
ng
ne
w
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
to
th
es
ol
ut
io
n
sta
te
(A
ki
n
19
84
;G
oe
l1
99
5)
.
V
1 P
5
Re
je
ct
op
er
at
or
,
i.e
.
an
ele
m
en
ta
ry
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
pr
oc
es
s
de
te
rm
in
in
g
pr
op
os
al
to
be
un
sa
tis
fa
ct
or
y
(S
ta
uff
er
&
U
llm
an
19
91
;G
oe
l1
99
5)
.
V
1 P
5
Se
le
ct
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
op
er
at
or
,i
.e.
an
ele
m
en
ta
ry
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
pr
oc
es
s
th
at
se
le
ct
so
ne
so
ur
ce
of
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
fro
m
ar
an
ge
of
se
ve
ra
ls
ou
rc
es
(S
ta
uff
er
&
U
llm
an
19
91
).
V
1 P
5
Su
sp
en
d
op
er
at
or
,i
.e.
an
ele
m
en
ta
ry
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
pr
oc
es
s
te
rm
in
at
in
g
a
de
ci
sio
n
w
ith
ou
ta
de
fin
ite
co
nc
lu
sio
n
(S
ta
uff
er
&
U
llm
an
19
91
).
V
1 P
5
(c
on
tin
ue
d
on
ne
xt
pa
ge
)
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Ta
bl
e
2.
(c
on
tin
ue
d)
D
ec
isi
on
m
ak
in
g,
i.e
.t
he
pr
oc
es
so
fd
et
er
m
in
in
g
w
ha
tc
on
ce
pt
(s
)s
ho
ul
d
be
ta
ke
n
fo
rw
ar
d
fo
rf
ur
th
er
de
ve
lo
pm
en
tf
ro
m
ar
an
ge
of
al
te
rn
at
iv
es
.
V
3 P
13
Ex
ec
ut
iv
e
fu
nc
tio
ns
/
Cr
ea
tiv
e
ou
tp
ut
pr
od
uc
tio
n
Re
as
on
in
g
Ru
le
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n
op
er
at
or
,i
.e.
an
ele
m
en
ta
ry
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
pr
oc
es
sa
pp
ly
in
g
ar
ith
m
et
ic
al
ru
le
s
an
d
m
ak
in
g
as
se
rt
io
ns
an
d
lo
gi
ca
ld
ed
uc
tio
ns
(C
ha
n
19
90
).
V
1 P
5
Pl
an
ni
ng
,
m
on
ito
rin
g,
an
d
se
le
ct
in
g/
Pr
od
uc
in
g
an
d
co
m
bi
ni
ng
co
nc
ep
ts
Ca
lc
ul
at
e
op
er
at
or
,i
.e.
an
ele
m
en
ta
ry
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
pr
oc
es
s
in
fe
rr
in
g
ne
w
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
by
co
m
bi
ni
ng
ex
ist
in
g
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
(S
ta
uff
er
&
U
llm
an
19
91
).
V
1 P
5
Pa
tc
h
op
er
at
or
,
i.e
.
an
ele
m
en
ta
ry
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
pr
oc
es
s
th
at
ad
ds
or
co
m
bi
ne
si
nf
or
m
at
io
n
w
ith
ou
tm
ak
in
g
it
le
ss
ab
str
ac
t(
St
au
ffe
r&
U
llm
an
19
91
).
V
1 P
5
Re
fin
e
op
er
at
or
,
i.e
.
an
ele
m
en
ta
ry
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
pr
oc
es
s
th
at
m
ak
es
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
m
or
es
pe
ci
fic
an
d
le
ss
ab
str
ac
t(
St
au
ffe
r&
U
llm
an
19
91
).
V
1 P
5
Si
m
ul
at
e
op
er
at
or
,i
.e.
an
ele
m
en
ta
ry
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
pr
oc
es
st
ha
tr
ep
re
se
nt
s
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
at
th
ep
ro
pe
rl
ev
el
of
ab
str
ac
tio
n
in
or
de
rt
o
re
la
te
it
(S
ta
uff
er
&
U
llm
an
19
91
).
V
1 P
5
In
fe
re
nc
e,
i.e
.t
he
pr
oc
es
s
of
m
ak
in
g
lo
gi
ca
lj
ud
ge
m
en
ts
on
th
e
ba
sis
of
pr
e-
ex
ist
in
g
in
fo
rm
at
io
n.
V
1 P
8
Se
ei
ng
th
at
,i
.e.
th
e
pr
oc
es
so
fd
ev
elo
pi
ng
a
ra
tio
na
le
fo
rd
es
ig
n
de
ci
sio
ns
pe
rt
ai
ni
ng
to
pr
op
os
al
sm
ad
ed
ur
in
g
th
ep
ro
ce
ss
of
se
ei
ng
as
.
V
2 P
3
(c
on
tin
ue
d
on
ne
xt
pa
ge
)
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Ta
bl
e
2.
(c
on
tin
ue
d)
A
na
lo
gi
ca
lr
ea
so
ni
ng
,i
.e.
th
e
pr
oc
es
s
of
us
in
g
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
ab
ou
tk
no
w
n
se
m
an
tic
co
nc
ep
ts
to
un
de
rs
ta
nd
ne
w
ly
pr
es
en
te
d
se
m
an
tic
co
nc
ep
ts,
e.g
.
th
os
ec
on
ta
in
ed
w
ith
in
ad
es
ig
n
pr
ob
le
m
.
V
3 P
8/
V
1 P
9
Ca
se
-b
as
ed
re
as
on
in
g,
i.e
.t
he
pr
oc
es
so
fc
on
sc
io
us
ly
m
ap
pi
ng
kn
ow
le
dg
e
of
pr
ev
io
us
ly
en
co
un
te
re
d
pr
ob
le
m
so
nt
o
ac
ur
re
nt
pr
ob
le
m
.
V
3 P
9/
V
1 P
10
Cr
ea
tiv
e
ou
tp
ut
pr
od
uc
tio
n
G
en
er
at
in
g
co
nc
ep
ts
Cr
ea
te
op
er
at
or
,
i.e
.
an
ele
m
en
ta
ry
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
pr
oc
es
s
ge
ne
ra
tin
g
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
th
at
ap
pe
ar
ss
po
nt
an
eo
us
ly
(S
ta
uff
er
&
U
llm
an
19
91
).
V
1 P
5
Pr
od
uc
in
ga
nd
co
m
bi
ni
ng
co
nc
ep
ts
Sp
ec
ifi
ca
tio
n
op
er
at
or
,i
.e.
an
ele
m
en
ta
ry
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
pr
oc
es
sp
ro
du
ci
ng
a
pa
rt
ia
ls
ol
ut
io
n
or
pa
rt
ia
ls
pe
ci
fic
at
io
n
(A
ki
n
19
79
).
V
1 P
5
C
on
ce
pt
ge
ne
ra
tio
n,
i.e
.t
he
pr
oc
es
so
fg
en
er
at
in
gi
de
as
fo
rs
ol
ut
io
ns
/p
ar
tia
l
so
lu
tio
ns
to
de
sig
n
pr
ob
le
m
s.
V
3 P
3
Sy
nt
he
sis
in
g
co
nc
ep
ts
In
te
gr
at
io
n
op
er
at
or
,
i.e
.
an
ele
m
en
ta
ry
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
pr
oc
es
s
fu
rt
he
r
sp
ec
ify
in
g
th
ec
ur
re
nt
so
lu
tio
n
sta
te
(A
ki
n
19
79
).
V
1 P
5
D
ev
elo
pi
ng
a
so
lu
tio
n
ba
se
d
on
th
e
ou
tc
om
es
of
ac
tio
ns
ta
ke
n
to
str
uc
tu
re
/r
es
tr
uc
tu
re
th
ep
ro
bl
em
du
rin
g
co
-e
vo
lu
tio
na
ry
de
sig
n.
V
2 P
1
Sy
nt
he
sis
,
i.e
.
th
e
pr
oc
es
s
of
co
m
bi
ni
ng
an
d/
or
de
ve
lo
pi
ng
pr
ev
io
us
ly
ge
ne
ra
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4.1. Long-term memory and semantic processing
As shown in Table 2, long-term memory retrieval and semantic processing
have received attention across all three viewpoints. These processes may be
considered to relate. Firstly, long-term memory can be subdivided into (i)
episodic and (ii) semantic memory, dealing with (i) past events/experiences
bound with context and (ii) conceptual knowledge that is not tied to specific
events/experiences (Tulving 1983; Squire & Zola 1998). Semantic processing
refers to the interpretation of meanings conveyed by stimuli (Martin & Chao
2001). Semantic processing may involve what is termed semantic association, i.e.
the process of forming mental relationships between meaningful representations
(Federmeier et al. 2002). Sets of related representations are termed semantic
networks, and exist within semantic memory. Thus, semantic association is
intricately related to semantic memory (Martin & Chao 2001).
4.1.1. Long-term memory
Based on the review sample, it seems that both episodic and semantic memory
are involved in conceptual design. For example, the retrieval of previously
encountered design problems in case-based reasoning (Section 4.3)may be viewed
as an instance of episodic retrieval (Ball et al. 2004; Bilda et al. 2006), whilst
the retrieval of semantic concepts such as types of product and function during
concept generation is an instance of semantic retrieval (Jin & Benami 2010). Both
episodic and semantic memory are argued to play an important role in creative
ideation (broadly analogous with concept generation, discussed in Section 4.3) in
the broader psychology and neuroscience literature (e.g. Runco & Chand 1995;
Benedek et al. 2013; Abraham & Bubic 2015). However, whilst the involvement
of long-term memory in design concept generation has been investigated by a
number of authors in the sample, these studies do not clearly distinguish between
episodic and semantic memory (Jin & Benami 2010; Lane & Seery 2011).
In addition to concept generation, Ball et al. (2004, p. 495) also consider the
role of long-termmemory retrieval in design reasoning, specifically analogical and
case-based reasoning. They suggest that analogical reasoning involves the retrieval
and application of ‘abstract experiential knowledge’, whilst case-based reasoning
is driven by knowledge about ‘a concrete prior problem whose solution can be
mapped systematically onto the current problem’.Whilst the latter clearly pertains
to episodic memory, the nature of the former is unclear; the term ‘abstract’ is
suggestive of conceptual knowledge recalled from semantic memory, but the term
‘experiential’ pertains to episodic memory.
4.1.2. Semantic processing
Instances of semantic processing identifiable in the sample (Table 2) include
both (i) interpreting meanings conveyed by representations and (ii) forming
relationships between meaningful representations, i.e. semantic association
as noted above. In studies on design as exploration (V2), the process of
seeing as proposed by Goldschmidt (1991), and the closely related process of
re-interpretation considered by Suwa et al. (1998), both involve interpreting
meanings conveyed by visuo-spatial features and relations in sketches. That is,
potential design properties and attributes, and new functions, respectively. Seeing
as in particular appears to involve analogical reasoning, where inferences are
made about a situation based on similarities with other situations (analogies).
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Analogical reasoning, and the related process of case-based reasoning, are
typically treated as effortful, higher-order processes (discussed in Section 4.3).
In contrast, semantic association may be viewed as a largely automatic, implicit
process (Jin & Benami 2010). The association of mental representations (Table 2)
appears to be a fundamental process involved in concept generation (Jin&Benami
2010), and is also identifiable among the operators involved in design as search,
e.g. the inference operator proposed by Akin (1984) (Table 2). Another form of
semantic processing identifiable in the sample is what may be termed semantic
categorisation. That is, the process of assigning stimuli to conceptual categories
stored in memory based on their properties and attributes (Martin & Chao 2001).
Examples of semantic categorisation include the generalisation operator proposed
by Akin (1984), and the analysis and interpretation stages of the seeing process
proposed by Park & Kim (2007) (Table 2).
4.2. Visual perception and mental imagery processing
As shown in Table 2, we found visual perception to be investigated primarily
in studies on design as search (V1) and exploration (V2), and mental imagery
processing in studies on design as exploration and design activities (V3).
Visual perception is the process by which a human constructs and consciously
senses internal (visual) representations of the external world (Bruce et al. 2003;
Milner & Goodale 2008; Gobet et al. 2011). Internal representations produced
through perception may be termed percepts (Fish & Scrivener 1990; Finke 1996).
The process is primarily driven by afferent sensory information pertaining to
external visuo-spatial representations (Eysenck & Keane 2005). Closely related to
visual perception is visual mental imagery processing, involving the generation,
maintenance and transformation of visual mental images (Kosslyn 1995). Mental
imagery may be considered to mimic the experience of visual perception by
generating and sustaining internal visual representations that may be inspected,
but without necessarily using perceptual input and relying heavily on information
retrieved from memory (Kosslyn 1995). However, the degree to which the two
processes may be considered to be similar remains a matter for debate in the
psychology and neuroscience literature (Ganis 2013). Note also that percepts are
typically distinguished from mental images (Fish & Scrivener 1990; Finke 1996).
4.2.1. Visual perception
Authors studying design as search were found to investigate processes that may be
interpreted as perception, e.g. the data input operator considered by Chan (1990)
(Table 2). In these studies, perception is largely treated as a process providing the
designer with external information when information retrieved from memory is
not sufficient to progress the search process. The basic mechanisms of perception
are typically not conceptualised or studied in depth, perhaps owing to the
perspective that design is a rational search process and the consequent focus on
higher-order processes such as reasoning and decision making (Section 4.3).
In contrast with the above, several studies on design as exploration were found
to investigate more specific visual perceptual processes. This may be expected
given the considerable focus on sketch-based (i.e. visual) design tasks in these
studies (Section 3.3). For instance, Park & Kim (2007, p. 3) include a process
termed ‘perception’ as part of the broader process of seeing in their model of visual
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reasoning in conceptual design. That is, based on their description, developing and
consciously sensing percepts (Table 2). The perceptual cognitive actions proposed
by Suwa et al. (1998) may be considered to reflect the following processes to
some extent: (i) visual attention, where the designer selects and focuses on a
particular part of a sketch (Zhang & Lin 2013); and (ii) perceptual organisation,
referring to the process of organising visual information to form coherent visuo-
spatial representations (Bruce et al. 2003) (Table 2). With respect to the latter,
the process of unexpected discovery studied by Suwa et al. (2000) may be viewed
as an instance of perceptual re-organisation (Table 2). That is, the process of
re-organising visual information to reveal previously unseen features and relations
of visuo-spatial representations (Bruce et al. 2003; Tversky 2014). Indeed, in a
later paper published in a psychology journal, Suwa (2003) refers to unexpected
discovery as perceptual re-organisation. Three types of re-organisation process
were identified by Suwa et al. (2000), namely re-organisation to reveal a previously
unseen (i) visual feature, (ii) organisational or spatial relation and (iii) space in
between previously drawn elements.
4.2.2. Visual mental imagery processing
The processing of visual mental imagery is argued to be centrally involved in the
generation of concepts by numerous authors in the sample (Goldschmidt 1991;
Athavankar 1997; Kavakli & Gero 2001; Bilda & Gero 2007; Park & Kim 2007;
Jin & Benami 2010). We found that mental imagery has received considerable
attention in studies on design as exploration (V2), but virtually none in studies
on design as search (V1). This may again be owing to a focus on higher-order
processes in studies on design as search as suggested above, and/or the perspective
that the designer can be reduced to an information processing system in an
objective reality. In contrast, studies on design as exploration tend to view the
designer as a person constructing their own reality, in line with the notions
of situatedness (Gero & Kannengiesser 2004) and reflection-in-action (Dorst &
Dijkhuis 1995).
Kosslyn (1995) describes four kinds of mental imagery process:
• image generation, i.e. forming mental images by either maintaining
perceptual input or retrieving information from long-term memory;
• image inspection, i.e. interpreting the features and relations of mental
images;
• image maintenance, i.e. retaining the features and relations of mental
images;
• image transformation, i.e. rotating, re-sizing, and manipulating the
structure of mental images.
As shown in Table 2, studies in the sample were found to report all of the above
processes except image inspection. Bilda & Gero (2007) draw parallels between
mental imagery processing and visual perception (discussed further in Section
5.2.2), suggesting that designers may inspect their mental images in the same way
that they inspect external sketches, i.e. by focusing attention on different visuo-
spatial features and relations. The authors code a blindfolded designer’s imagery-
based protocol using perceptual cognitive action codes pertaining to visual
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attention (attending to visuo-spatial features and relations, Table 2). However, it
is unclear from the findings reported whether evidence supporting this process
was identified or not.
4.3. Higher-order processes
A distinction may be made between the cognitive processes discussed in Sections
4.1 and 4.2 and what are termed higher-order processes in this paper. That is,
processes that are largely mediated by the frontal lobes of the brain and may
involve the interaction of several other processes. As conveyed by Table 2, we
found higher-order processes to be studied across all viewpoints (in varying
degrees). Whilst the processes may be described in different terms by different
authors, it may be seen in Table 2 that these descriptions can be interpreted as
describing the same fundamental process. In summary, it seems that the following
higher-order processes may be central to conceptual design (presented in order of
discussion below):
• Problem structuring (e.g. Goel 1995; Suwa et al. 2000; Liikkanen & Perttula
2009), i.e. defining and relating the goals, constraints and requirements
to be addressed by the designer. Design problems may be restructured
during designing, i.e. the definition of and/or relationships between goals,
constraints and requirements may be altered.
• Evaluating concepts (e.g. Stauffer &Ullman 1991; Maher & Tang 2003; Jin &
Chusilp 2006), i.e. assessing the goodness of a concept on the basis of value,
aesthetics, affect or objective criteria.
• Decision making (e.g. Stauffer & Ullman 1991; Kim & Ryu 2014), i.e.
deliberately selecting (or not selecting) one option (e.g. a concept or a course
of action) over another.
• Reasoning (e.g. Chan 1990; Goldschmidt 1991; Ball et al. 2004), i.e. thinking
and drawing conclusions in accordancewith some systemof logic. Instances
of both deductive and inductive reasoning were identified. Two specific
forms of inductive reasoning that appear to be important are: (i) analogical
reasoning, where a newly encountered concept/situation is compared
with previously encountered concepts/situations to infer an understanding
of the former (discussed at length by Goel (1997)) and (ii) case-based
reasoning, where a newly encountered problem is comparedwith previously
encountered problems to infer a solution and/or solution procedure for the
former (conceptualised and discussed in depth by Maher et al. (1995)).
• Generating concepts (e.g. Akin 1984; Jin & Benami 2010), i.e. producing new
ideas for solutions or partial solutions to design problems.
• Synthesising concepts (e.g. Akin 1984; McNeill et al. 1998; Jin & Chusilp
2006), i.e. combining and developing previously generated ideas to produce
more mature ideas.
Executive functions are a type of higher-order cognitive process involved
in the planning, selection and monitoring of human behaviour to facilitate the
achievement of goals (Rabbitt 2004; Chan et al. 2008). Executive functions in
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psychology research typically include processes such as goal setting, selective
attention, decision making and problem solving, although there are several
different models of executive functioning (Chan et al. 2008). Based on the
review sample, it seems that the following processes may be viewed as executive
functions in conceptual design (Table 2): (i) problem structuring; (ii) concept
evaluation and (iii) decision making. It is these processes that appear to facilitate:
(i) planning, in the form of identifying and structuring goals (specifying desired
design outputs), constraints (specifying limitations on design outputs) and
requirements (specifying criteria design outputs should meet); (ii) monitoring,
in the form of assessing the goodness of design outputs against goals, constraints
and requirements and (iii) selection, in the form of decision making at various
points during design tasks (e.g. a decision to reject a concept based on the outcome
of evaluation, followed by a decision to restructure the problem by defining new
goals or altering existing goals). With the exception of decision making, which we
did not identify in studies on design as exploration (V2), all of these processes
have received attention across the three viewpoints covered by the review as
shown in Table 2. This is not to say that decision making is not involved in
design as exploration; rather, it was not identified in the studies included in the
review sample. Having said this, several authors focusing on design as exploration
mention decision making generally in their discourse (e.g. Goldschmidt 1991;
Suwa et al. 1998).
The remaining higher-order processes identified from the sample – that is,
reasoning, generating and synthesising, as listed above – appear to be higher-order
processes involved primarily in the production of creative outputs. That is, in a
conceptual design context, concepts – i.e. ideas for solutions or partial solutions
to design problems. Having said this, it seems that reasoning is also involved in
executive functioning to some extent (as indicated in Table 2), e.g. Stauffer &
Ullman (1991) suggest that the simulate and calculateoperators listed inTable 2 are
involved in evaluation.As discussed in Section 4.1, there appear to be relationships
between concept generation and lower-order memory and semantic processes.
However, whilst understanding the nature of these relationships is important for
the development of models and theories of design cognition, exploration of these
relationships is beyond the scope of this paper.
5. Discussion
As discussed in Section 1, the generic classification elaborated in Section 4
(Figure 1) is based on a set of 35 cognitive processes identified through a
systematic review of 47 protocol studies on conceptual design. The classification
was motivated by observed differences in the way that cognition is described
across different studies, leading us to pose the following ontological question: what
cognitive processes actually exist within this domain, and how should they be
defined and organised for study? In the following sub-sections, we firstly discuss
the implications of the classificationwith respect to this question (Section 5.1).We
then outline future empirical work required to clarify and expand the classification
per se (Section 5.2).
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5.1. Towards a shared ontology
Questions regarding the nature of design cognition ontology may be seen
to mirror ontological debates in the cognitive psychology and neuroscience
literature, where efforts are currently under way to develop a shared ontology
of cognitive processes, representations and tasks (Poldrack et al. 2011). In this
respect, several design researchers have proposed ontologies to describe the
phenomenon of design (e.g. Gero 1990; Sim&Duffy 2003; Gero & Kannengiesser
2004, 2007). However, these are not always intended to describe design at the
cognitive level, and those that do describe cognitive processes are not necessarily
comprehensive. For example, Gero’s situated FBS ontology describes design in
terms of general interpretation, transformation and focusing processes operating
on functional, behavioural and structural design variables (Gero &Kannengiesser
2004, 2007). However, these processes are positioned as encompassing a range of
more specific cognitive processes, examples of which are only briefly mentioned.
Whilst the ontology is intentionally general so that it may be applied to describe
any instance of designing (Gero et al. 2014), it cannot be viewed as comprehensive
at the cognitive level.
A generic, shared ontology of cognitive processes in design cognition research
would not only provide a common basis for developing theories and models,
but would also increase the comparability of findings from different protocol
studies and promote a more integrated body of knowledge on design cognition.
Two key limitations of protocol analysis are: (i) its reliance upon subjective
inferences from verbal self-reports and (ii) its focus on small samples (owing to
the resource-intensive nature of qualitative data processing), which may increase
the uncertainty associated with results (Hay et al. under review). As suggested in
Hay et al. (under review) and Dinar et al. (2015), controlled experiments using
cognitive tests and metrics could provide a means to test the findings of protocol
studies using a more objective approach and larger samples. In this respect, a
shared ontology would provide a consistent basis for selecting and/or developing
standard tests of the cognitive abilities contributing to design, an area that has thus
far received relatively little attention in the literature (with the notable exception
of work by Shah et al. (2012, 2013) and Khorshidi et al. (2014)). In addition,
the development of a generic ontology that is conceptually and terminologically
consistent with that of cognitive psychology and neuroscience would facilitate
comparisons between design cognition studies and cognitive studies of related
activities such as artistic and musical composition. This would also increase the
capability of design cognition researchers to contribute to the broader body of
knowledge on human cognition, and vice versa, for psychologists to contribute to
knowledge on design cognition.
The classification presented in Figure 1 is based on a sample of 47 protocol
studies. As such, the cognitive processes included are necessarily limited to those
that were identifiable in the reviewed studies. Nonetheless, given its basis in
both the design cognition and cognitive psychology literature, we suggest that
the classification provides a starting point for developing the kind of ontology
characterised above. As conveyed in Section 4, we have begun tomap the cognitive
processes in the classification to different tasks and activities involved in the design
process. It may also be possible to map the processes to existing design ontologies
such as those cited above, potentially highlighting further processes that are
currently overlooked as well as avenues for resolving competing ontological
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perspectives. The classification may additionally provide a basis for identifying
what ontological categories, if any, are particular to the different kinds of designing
reflected in the three viewpoints outlined in Section 3. We suggest that future
work to expand and develop the classification towards an ontology should adopt a
triangulated approach, combining induction from empirical data with deduction
frommodels and theories of conceptual design to ensure comprehensive coverage
of the cognitive processes involved. As highlighted by Poldrack et al. (2011, p.
3), continued efforts in this respect must involve the broader design cognition
community; an emergent ontology that is ‘based on the consensus obtainedwithin
a small group of individuals’ will be largely useless to those who do not ‘share the
group’s ontological commitments’.
5.2. Future empirical work
In addition to potentially providing a foundation for ontology development, the
generic classification elaborated herein also highlights several avenues for future
work relating to specific cognitive processes. These are discussed below.
5.2.1. The role of long-term memory and semantic processing
As noted in Section 4.1, both episodic and semantic memory are argued to play
an important role in creative ideation in the broader psychology and neuroscience
literature (e.g. Runco & Chand 1995; Benedek et al. 2013; Abraham & Bubic
2015). Consistent with this view, a number of authors in our sample were found to
suggest that episodic and semantic memory retrieval may be involved in concept
generation (broadly analogous with creative ideation). However, although we
were able to identify potential instances by interpreting descriptions of memory
retrieval provided by authors (Section 4.1.1), we found that episodic and semantic
memory are rarely explicitly distinguished. Thus, given their potential importance
in creativity and ideation, clarifying the nature and role of episodic and semantic
memory in conceptual design presents an avenue for future research.
Like long-term memory above, semantic processing – and in particular,
semantic association – is argued to play an important role in the generation
of creative ideas in the broader psychology and neuroscience literature (e.g.
Mednick 1962; Mumford et al. 2012; Beaty et al. 2014). Furthermore, semantic
processing typically involves retrieval of semantic knowledge to some extent and
is therefore closely related to semantic memory, which is also argued to be central
to creative ideation as discussed above. As such, semantic processing constitutes
a salient avenue for research on conceptual design cognition. However, semantic
processes are frequently rather poorly and inconsistently conceptualised in the
reviewed studies. For example, the processes of both seeing as and re-interpretation
appear to involve semantic processing as discussed above; however, this processing
is described in different terms. The term ‘seeing as’ arguably obfuscates the
nature of the processes that it describes, and is not a term that is recognised
in the psychology literature. Leblebici-Basar & Altarriba (2013) investigate the
transformation of verbal concepts into visual/form-based concepts, which also
seems to be a form of semantic processing but is not clearly defined as such. To
provide a common basis for future work on semantic processing in conceptual
design, there is a need to develop more consistent definitions of the types
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of semantic processes involved, perhaps using established concepts from the
psychology literature.
5.2.2. The role of sketching
Several authors may be seen to suggest that during sketching, visual perception
(Section 4.2.1), semantic processes (Section 4.1.2) andmental imagery processing
(Section 4.2.2) are intimately related (Goldschmidt 1991; Park & Kim 2007; Jin &
Benami 2010). Designers generate mental images by retrieving and associating
representations from long-term memory (Goldschmidt 1991; Kavakli & Gero
2001; Jin & Benami 2010), processes that are discussed in Section 4.1. They
externalise these images through sketching, perceive the elements of the sketches
produced and interpret meanings conveyed by what they perceive e.g. design
properties/attributes (seeing as, Table 2), functions (re-interpretation, Table 2), etc.
This drives the generation of new images and/or the transformation ofmaintained
images, which may again be externalised and so on. In addition to supporting
processes such as re-interpretation and unexpected discovery, sketching is argued
to be beneficial in offloading the designer’s visuo-spatial working memory and
freeing up cognitive resources during design tasks. That is, sketches serve as
an ‘external memory’ where visuo-spatial features and relations may be stored,
inspected and manipulated as opposed to maintaining them in working memory
(Suwa et al. 1998; Bilda & Gero 2007).
In spite of the observation that sketching supports key processes involved in
conceptual design, there is also evidence in the reviewed studies suggesting that
designers can still produce satisfactory design outcomes without sketching (e.g.
Athavankar 1997; Bilda & Gero 2007; Athavankar et al. 2008). That is, relying
on mental imagery alone. For example, Bilda et al. (2006) found no significant
differences in aspects such as design outcome scores and ideation performance
between designers who were blindfolded and unable to sketch, and those who had
full access to sketching and visual perception processes. One potential explanation
for these observations is that designers may treat mental images inmuch the same
way as they treat percepts of external representations. For instance, Kosslyn (1995)
argues that humans inspect and interpretmental images through processes similar
to those employed in the inspection and interpretation of external representations.
From this perspective, itmay be the case thatmany of the processes conventionally
executed on percepts of external sketches in design may equally be executed on
mental images. This argument is advanced to some extent in Kavakli & Gero
(2001), Kavakli & Gero (2002), Bilda et al. (2006), and Bilda & Gero (2007), with
Kavakli & Gero (2001) claiming that visual perception and visual mental imagery
constitute ‘functionally equivalent’ processes.
The role of sketching has only been investigated in 5 of the 47 studies included
in our review sample (Athavankar 1997; Suwa et al. 1998; Bilda et al. 2006; Bilda
& Gero 2007; Athavankar et al. 2008). Furthermore, these studies employed small
samples of 1–6 designers. As such, future studies are required to further explore
the tentative findings contributed thus far on a larger scale. In addition, there
are several issues with existing studies that should be addressed in future work.
Virtually all of the work conducted on the role of sketching in the sample is
based on the premise that visual perception and mental imagery are similar,
or even ‘functionally equivalent’ processes, and designers therefore treat mental
images in much the same way as they treat percepts of external representations
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as discussed above. In turn, the coding schemes and approaches adopted in these
studies are intimately tied to this premise. For instance, similarities between visual
perception and mental imagery processing appear to be used as a justification
for applying a perception-based coding scheme to code a mental imagery-based
protocol in Bilda et al. (2006). However, as noted above, the degree to which the
two processes can be considered to be equivalent remains amatter for debate in the
psychology and neuroscience literature. They are generally considered to overlap
both cognitively and neurally, but there are differing perspectives on the extent
of this overlap (Ganis 2013). Thus, there is a need to consider and critique these
alternative perspectives in a design context, and potentially to investigate the role
of sketching from multiple theoretical perspectives in order to arrive at a more
definitive position.
5.2.3. Working memory
Stauffer &Ullman (1991, p. 114) refer to a cognitive system termed the ‘controller’
in the context of design as search, which is included in Newell and Simon’s
(1972) information processing model and may be seen to essentially ‘supervise’
the control and execution of cognitive processes. The controller is responsible for
sequencing operators (i.e. elementary information processes) in design as search
and integrating different kinds of information. This reflects the notion of what
may be termed the central executive in psychology research. The central executive
is a theoretical cognitive system involved in co-ordinating and regulating cognitive
processes, as well as binding different kinds of information to form coherent
episodes. The central executive is a key component of working memory models,
perhaps most notably Baddeley’s multi-component model (Baddeley 1983, 2003).
In thismodel, workingmemory is proposed to constitute a set of cognitive systems
supporting the simultaneous storage andmanipulation of visuo-spatial and verbal
information. In addition to the central executive, working memory is comprised
of: (i) the visuo-spatial sketchpad, supporting storage and manipulation of
visuo-spatial information; (ii) the phonological loop, supporting storage and
manipulation of verbal information and (iii) the episodic buffer, supporting the
integration of visuo-spatial and verbal information into coherent chronologically
sequenced units (Baddeley 1983, 2003).
Based on the reviewed studies, working memory appears to be involved in
conceptual design. The term is at least brieflymentioned by authors across all three
viewpoints, e.g.: V1 – Stauffer & Ullman (1991); V2 – Bilda et al. (2006) and V3
– Liikkanen & Perttula (2009). It appears in the information processing models
that typically underpin studies on design as search (e.g. Chan 1990; Stauffer &
Ullman 1991), as well as in general accounts of designers’ cognitive processing
(e.g. Liikkanen & Perttula 2009; Leblebici-Basar & Altarriba 2013; Kim & Ryu
2014). Themajority of references toworkingmemory appear to focus on the use of
the visuo-spatial sketchpad to support mental imagery processing (e.g. Bilda et al.
2006; Bilda & Gero 2007; Athavankar et al. 2008), which is perhaps unsurprising
given the central role that mental imagery appears to play in conceptual design.
The view that workingmemory is involved in conceptual design is consistent with
the broader psychology and neuroscience literature, where working memory is
implicated in both creative idea generation and evaluation (e.g. Dietrich 2004;
Mumford et al. 2012). However, other than a study on mental imagery processing
and working memory limitations by Bilda & Gero (2007), we found that it has
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received little investigative attention in the reviewedprotocol studies. That is, there
is little empirical evidence providing insight into the role of working memory in
conceptual design. Consequently, working memory processes are not currently
included in the classification presented in Figure 1.
Given the role of working memory in creative ideation and evaluation,
investigating its role in conceptual design provides another salient avenue for
future research. Work in this area could also contribute to expanding our
proposed classification of cognitive processes. In addition to the visuo-spatial
sketchpad, future research on working memory should also consider the role of
the phonological loop in conceptual design given that designers frequently deal
with verbal information from e.g. design briefs and technical documentation in
addition to visual information from sketches and models. For future studies, it
should also be noted that working memory and short-termmemory are generally
not considered to be synonymous terms by psychologists, although they appear to
be employed as such in several papers in the sample (e.g. Stauffer & Ullman 1991;
Bilda & Gero 2007).
5.2.4. The nature of concept generation and synthesis
Regarding creative output production, an area requiring clarification is the nature
of synthesis and its relationship with concept generation. Both of the following
perspectives may be detected in the sample: (i) synthesis involves combining
ideas previously generated through concept generation to form more mature
concepts (e.g. Jin & Chusilp 2006); and (ii) synthesis contributes to the process
of concept generation (e.g. Lane & Seery 2011). One potential explanation for
co-existing interpretations of synthesis may be identified in the work of Finke
et al. (1992) on creative cognition, which appears to have influenced certain
authors in the sample (notably Jin & Benami (2010)). As discussed in Section
4.2.2, the generation, maintenance and transformation of mental images is argued
to be centrally involved in the generation of concepts. In this respect, Finke
et al. (1992) describe two kinds of synthesis: (i) mental synthesis of an image,
i.e. assembling the component parts of a mental image and (ii) conceptual
combination, i.e. combining concepts with different attributes to produce new
concepts. New concepts produced through conceptual combination may inherit
certain attributes from the individual concepts, as well as possess emergent
attributes different from those of individual concepts.
Given that concept generation appears to fundamentally involve mental
imagery processing, it may be the case that authors discussing synthesis as part of
the concept generation process are referring to the mental synthesis of an image.
In contrast, authors describing synthesis as the process of combining previously
generated concepts to produce more mature concepts are more likely referring to
conceptual combination. However, it is worth highlighting that neither of these
processes maps clearly to the description of synthesis provided in the most recent
evolution of Gero’s function–behaviour–structure (FBS) framework, which treats
synthesis as a two stage process of (i) mapping behavioural design variables to
structural variables and (ii) externally representing the structure comprised by
these variables (Gero & Kannengiesser 2004). Considering the broader design
literature, Sim&Duffy (2003) provide a comprehensive review of design activities.
They note the existence of descriptions of synthesis aligning with that provided
by Gero & Kannengiesser (2004), e.g. the mapping of dependencies between
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function, form and behaviour, as well as the perspective that synthesis is a form of
abduction. Nonetheless, Sim & Duffy (2003, p. 205) argue that synthesis is ‘more
than just a mapping of dependencies’, suggesting that it may rather be viewed as
a process of integrating ‘concepts or parts into a whole’. Overall, then, there is a
need for future work to clarify what is meant by the term ‘synthesis’ in conceptual
design, and the nature of the process(es) that it denotes.
5.2.5. Unidentified cognitive processes
Finally, as noted in Section 5.1, the cognitive processes included in the
classification are necessarily limited to those that were identifiable in the reviewed
studies. In this respect, it is possible that there may be cognitive processes
considered to play an important role in designing elsewhere in the literature
that were not investigated in our sample. A notable example is learning, which
may be broadly defined as the process of acquiring new skills and knowledge.
Sim & Duffy (2004) highlight that learning in design practice has been studied
by a number of authors. However, we did not identify learning as a cognitive
process explicitly studied in our sample. Sim & Duffy (2004, p. 40) highlight that
the ‘observation that designers learn [. . .] is supported by protocol studies in
design that [demonstrate] experienced designers can reach satisfactory design
solutions more effectively than novice or naïve designers’, citing Lloyd & Scott
(1994), who are included in our review sample, as an example. A similar example
may be found in Ball et al. (2004), who conclude that experts are more likely
than novices to carry out analogical reasoning in a rapid, automatic fashion based
on knowledge schemas. The schematisation of domain knowledge is frequently
associated with the development of domain expertise, which may be interpreted
as learning. Nonetheless, Ball et al. (2004) do not explicitly study learning.
Considering the continual evolution in our understanding of design cognition,
identifying and addressing gaps in the proposed classificationmust be an ongoing
endeavour. Given that different methods may provide different views on the same
phenomenon, this may entail empirical work using other approaches such as
controlled experiments and case studies. In addition to empirical work per se,
systematic reviews focused on other research methods may also reveal additional
cognitive processes.
6. Conclusion
Inconsistencies in the concepts and terminology applied to describe cognition
across different viewpoints on designing raise important ontological questions
for the field: what cognitive processes actually exist within this domain, and
how should they be defined and organised for study? Towards addressing these
questions, this paper has presented the first generic classification of cognitive
processes investigated in protocol studies on conceptual design cognition.
Mapping cognitive processes described by design authors to more generic,
established definitions in the cognitive psychology literature has revealed 6
categories of process that appear to be commonly investigated and are therefore
likely to be prevalent in conceptual design: (1) long-term memory; (2) semantic
processing; (3) visual perception; (4) mental imagery processing; (5) creative
output production and (6) executive functions. Each category is comprised of
27/42
available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/dsj.2017.6
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Glasgow Library, on 13 Sep 2017 at 11:24:36, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use,
several processes. In addition, the classification and its development highlight 6
key avenues for future empirical work on cognitive processes in conceptual design:
1. clarifying the nature and role of episodic and semanticmemory in conceptual
design;
2. developing more consistent definitions of the types of semantic processes
involved in conceptual design;
3. considering and critiquing alternative perspectives on the similarities
between visual perception and mental imagery processing, and in turn
investigating the role of sketching from multiple theoretical perspectives
to arrive at a more definitive position;
4. investigating the role of working memory in conceptual design, including
the use of both the visuo-spatial sketchpad for mental imagery and the
phonological loop for verbal design information;
5. clarifying the meaning of the term ‘synthesis’ in conceptual design and the
nature of the process(es) it denotes and
6. expanding the classification as a whole to include any cognitive processes
not identified from the reviewed studies, but implicated in conceptual design
elsewhere in the literature (e.g. learning).
In addition to providing a more unified view of the field, the classification
provides a starting point for the development of a generic, shared ontology
of cognitive processes in design. An ontology of this nature that aligns with
that of cognitive psychology and neuroscience would have several benefits,
including: provision of a common basis for model and theory development;
increased comparability of studies, both within design and across related fields
such as artistic and musical composition; provision of a consistent basis for
defining/selecting standard tests of cognitive design abilities; and increased
capability for cross-disciplinary contributions by design cognition researchers
and cognitive psychologists. In closing, it is important to highlight that not only
should future work on design cognition address gaps in understanding within
the design community; it should also contribute to broadening knowledge on
design in the fields of cognitive psychology and neuroscience, where the activity
remains under-researched in spite of its fundamental importance across multiple
contexts and sectors. As such, we hope that our colleagues in both design research
and cognitive science will contribute to the future empirical and theoretical work
needed to develop a more consistent design cognition ontology.
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Appendix A. Cognitive processes identified from
protocol studies
The 35 cognitive processes identified from studies on design as search, design as
exploration and design activities in our systematic review sample are presented
in Table 3 below. Each process is assigned a code identifier consisting of
28/42
available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/dsj.2017.6
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Glasgow Library, on 13 Sep 2017 at 11:24:36, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use,
Ta
bl
e
3.
O
ve
rv
ie
w
of
co
gn
iti
ve
pr
oc
es
se
si
de
nt
ifi
ed
fro
m
re
vi
ew
ed
pr
ot
oc
ol
stu
di
es
ID
C
og
ni
tiv
e
pr
oc
es
se
s
in
ve
st
ig
at
ed
2
D
es
cr
ip
tio
n
Au
th
or
s
D
om
ai
ns
1
V
IE
W
PO
IN
T
1:
D
ES
IG
N
A
S
SE
A
RC
H
V
1 P
1
So
lu
tio
n
se
ar
ch
Th
ep
ro
ce
ss
of
tr
an
sfo
rm
in
g
kn
ow
le
dg
es
ta
te
sw
ith
in
ad
es
ig
n
pr
ob
le
m
sp
ac
et
hr
ou
gh
th
ea
pp
lic
at
io
n
of
op
er
at
or
s(
V
1 P
3)
,b
eg
in
ni
ng
w
ith
th
e
pr
ob
le
m
sta
te
an
d
pr
og
re
ss
in
g
th
ro
ug
h
in
te
rm
ed
ia
te
de
sig
n
sta
te
su
nt
il
th
eg
oa
l(
i.e
.s
ol
ut
io
n)
sta
te
is
re
ac
he
d.
St
at
et
ra
ns
fo
rm
at
io
ns
m
ay
be
:(
i)
la
te
ra
l,
i.e
.m
ov
in
g
be
tw
ee
n
di
ffe
re
nt
id
ea
s;
or
(ii
)v
er
tic
al
,i
.e.
in
cr
ea
sin
g
th
el
ev
el
of
de
ta
il
of
th
es
am
ei
de
a.
(A
ki
n
19
84
;C
ha
n
19
90
;S
ta
uff
er
&
U
llm
an
19
91
;G
oe
l
19
95
)
A
D
;E
D
V
1 P
2
Pr
ob
le
m
str
uc
tu
rin
g
Th
ep
ro
ce
ss
of
de
fin
in
g
th
ed
es
ig
n
pr
ob
le
m
pr
io
rt
o
or
du
rin
g
th
es
ea
rc
h
fo
ra
so
lu
tio
n
(V
1 P
1)
.P
ro
bl
em
str
uc
tu
rin
g
in
vo
lv
es
ga
th
er
in
g
in
fo
rm
at
io
n,
se
tti
ng
go
al
s,
an
d
es
ta
bl
ish
in
g
co
ns
tr
ai
nt
s.
Re
str
uc
tu
rin
g
th
ep
ro
bl
em
re
su
lts
in
ch
an
ge
st
o
th
en
at
ur
ea
nd
/o
rs
tr
uc
tu
re
of
go
al
s,
co
ns
tr
ai
nt
s,
an
d/
or
re
qu
ire
m
en
ts.
(A
ki
n
19
84
;C
ha
n
19
90
;G
oe
l1
99
5)
A
D
;E
D
V
1 P
3
Pr
ob
le
m
de
co
m
po
sit
io
n
Th
ep
ro
ce
ss
of
br
ea
ki
ng
ad
es
ig
n
pr
ob
le
m
do
w
n
in
to
su
b-
pr
ob
le
m
s
th
ro
ug
h
th
es
pe
ci
fic
at
io
n
of
su
b-
go
al
s(
in
vo
lv
ed
in
pr
ob
le
m
str
uc
tu
rin
g,
V
1 P
2)
.
(L
lo
yd
&
Sc
ot
t1
99
4;
Li
ik
ka
ne
n
&
Pe
rt
tu
la
20
09
;L
ee
et
al
.2
01
4)
A
D
;E
D
;P
D
E
V
1 P
4
Pr
ob
le
m
re
fr
am
in
g
Th
ep
ro
ce
ss
of
re
co
gn
isi
ng
re
str
ic
tiv
ef
ra
m
es
of
re
fe
re
nc
es
ur
ro
un
di
ng
a
de
sig
n
pr
ob
le
m
,a
nd
sp
ec
ify
in
g
ne
w
fr
am
es
of
re
fe
re
nc
et
ha
ta
re
co
nd
uc
iv
et
o
so
lv
in
g
th
ep
ro
bl
em
.S
ui
ta
bl
ef
ra
m
es
of
re
fe
re
nc
ea
re
de
te
rm
in
ed
us
in
g
de
cla
ra
tiv
ea
nd
pr
oc
ed
ur
al
do
m
ai
n
kn
ow
le
dg
e
re
tr
ie
ve
d
fro
m
m
em
or
y
(V
1 P
6)
.
(A
ki
n
&
A
ki
n
19
96
)
A
D
(c
on
tin
ue
d
on
ne
xt
pa
ge
)
29/42
available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/dsj.2017.6
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Glasgow Library, on 13 Sep 2017 at 11:24:36, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use,
Ta
bl
e
3.
(c
on
tin
ue
d)
V
1 P
5
O
pe
ra
to
rs
O
pe
ra
to
rs
ar
ee
le
m
en
ta
ry
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
pr
oc
es
se
st
ha
tt
ra
ns
fo
rm
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
fro
m
in
pu
tt
o
ou
tp
ut
sta
te
s.
Th
ey
ar
et
he
ba
sic
co
m
po
ne
nt
of
pr
ob
le
m
str
uc
tu
rin
g
(V
1 P
1)
an
d
se
ar
ch
pr
oc
es
se
s(
V
1 P
2)
.P
ar
tic
ul
ar
se
qu
en
ce
so
fo
pe
ra
to
rs
ap
pl
ie
d
to
re
ac
h
as
ol
ut
io
n
an
d
m
an
ag
et
he
se
ar
ch
pr
oc
es
sa
re
te
rm
ed
se
ar
ch
m
et
ho
ds
an
d
co
nt
ro
ls
tr
at
eg
ie
s,
re
sp
ec
tiv
ely
.
O
pe
ra
to
rs
in
ve
sti
ga
te
d
in
th
er
ev
ie
w
ed
stu
di
es
m
ay
be
gr
ou
pe
d
in
to
4
ca
te
go
rie
s:
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
ga
th
er
in
g;
co
m
pr
eh
en
di
ng
,r
ep
re
se
nt
in
g,
an
d
str
uc
tu
rin
g
in
fo
rm
at
io
n;
ge
ne
ra
tin
g
an
d
sy
nt
he
sis
in
g;
an
d
ev
al
ua
tin
g
an
d
de
ci
sio
n
m
ak
in
g.
(A
ki
n,
19
84
;C
ha
n
19
90
;S
ta
uff
er
&
U
llm
an
19
91
;G
oe
l
19
95
;K
im
et
al
.
20
07
)
A
D
;E
D
;P
D
E
V
1 P
6
Re
tr
ie
va
lo
f
op
er
at
or
sa
nd
ot
he
r
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
fro
m
lo
ng
-te
rm
m
em
or
y
Kn
ow
le
dg
eo
fo
pe
ra
to
rs
(V
1 P
5)
is
sto
re
d
w
ith
in
sc
he
m
as
(i.
e.
ne
tw
or
ks
of
kn
ow
le
dg
eu
ni
ts)
in
ad
es
ig
ne
r’s
lo
ng
-te
rm
m
em
or
y.
D
ur
in
g
de
sig
ni
ng
,
sc
he
m
at
ar
ele
va
nt
to
th
ep
ro
bl
em
ar
er
et
rie
ve
d
fro
m
lo
ng
-te
rm
m
em
or
y
an
d
th
eo
pe
ra
to
rs
ac
tiv
at
ed
in
w
or
ki
ng
m
em
or
y.
Th
eo
pe
ra
to
rs
th
en
ac
t
on
ot
he
rk
in
ds
of
re
ca
lle
d
in
fo
rm
at
io
n,
e.g
.t
ec
hn
ic
al
kn
ow
le
dg
e,
kn
ow
le
dg
eo
fp
as
ts
ol
ut
io
ns
,e
tc
.,
to
eff
ec
ta
ch
an
ge
in
th
ep
ro
bl
em
str
uc
tu
re
or
de
sig
n
sta
te
(m
an
ife
ste
d
in
iti
al
ly
as
ac
ha
ng
ei
n
th
e
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
co
nt
en
to
fw
or
ki
ng
m
em
or
y)
.
(A
ki
n
19
84
;C
ha
n
19
90
;S
ta
uff
er
&
U
llm
an
19
91
)
A
D
;E
D
V
1 P
7
Ac
tiv
at
io
n
an
d
m
an
ip
ul
at
io
n
of
op
er
at
or
s
an
d
ot
he
r
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
in
w
or
ki
ng
m
em
or
y
(c
on
tin
ue
d
on
ne
xt
pa
ge
)
30/42
available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/dsj.2017.6
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Glasgow Library, on 13 Sep 2017 at 11:24:36, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use,
Ta
bl
e
3.
(c
on
tin
ue
d)
V
1 P
8
In
fe
re
nc
e
Th
ep
ro
ce
ss
of
m
ak
in
g
lo
gi
ca
lj
ud
ge
m
en
ts
on
th
eb
as
is
of
pr
e-
ex
ist
in
g
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
(e
.g
.p
rio
rk
no
w
le
dg
eo
rp
re
vi
ou
sj
ud
ge
m
en
ts)
ra
th
er
th
an
di
re
ct
ob
se
rv
at
io
ns
.B
ot
h
in
du
ct
iv
ea
nd
de
du
ct
iv
ei
nf
er
en
ce
ar
ea
rg
ue
d
to
be
in
vo
lv
ed
in
de
sig
ni
ng
.
(E
ck
er
sle
y
19
88
;
Ll
oy
d
&
Sc
ot
t1
99
4)
ED
V
1 P
9/
V
3 P
8
A
na
lo
gi
ca
l
re
as
on
in
g
Th
ep
ro
ce
ss
of
us
in
g
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
ab
ou
tk
no
w
n
se
m
an
tic
co
nc
ep
ts
to
un
de
rs
ta
nd
ne
w
ly
pr
es
en
te
d
se
m
an
tic
co
nc
ep
ts,
e.g
.t
ho
se
co
nt
ai
ne
d
w
ith
in
ad
es
ig
n
pr
ob
le
m
.A
na
lo
gi
ca
lr
ea
so
ni
ng
m
ay
be
ca
rr
ie
d
ou
ti
n
a
la
rg
ely
su
bc
on
sc
io
us
,a
ut
om
at
ic
fa
sh
io
n
us
in
g
sc
he
m
at
ar
et
rie
ve
d
fro
m
lo
ng
-te
rm
m
em
or
y
(s
ee
V
1 P
6)
.A
na
lo
gi
ca
lr
ea
so
ni
ng
m
ay
be
vi
ew
ed
as
a
fo
rm
of
in
du
ct
iv
er
ea
so
ni
ng
(s
ee
V
1 P
8)
.
(B
al
le
ta
l.
20
04
;
Li
ik
ka
ne
n
&
Pe
rt
tu
la
20
09
)
ED
;P
D
E
V
1 P
10
/V
3 P
9
Ca
se
-b
as
ed
re
as
on
in
g
Th
ep
ro
ce
ss
of
co
ns
ci
ou
sly
m
ap
pi
ng
kn
ow
le
dg
eo
fp
re
vi
ou
sly
en
co
un
te
re
d
pr
ob
le
m
so
nt
o
ac
ur
re
nt
pr
ob
le
m
in
or
de
rt
o
ge
ne
ra
te
co
nc
ep
ts
fo
r
so
lu
tio
ns
.L
ik
ea
na
lo
gi
ca
lr
ea
so
ni
ng
(V
1 P
9)
,c
as
e-
ba
se
d
re
as
on
in
g
m
ay
be
vi
ew
ed
as
af
or
m
of
in
du
ct
iv
er
ea
so
ni
ng
(s
ee
V
1 P
8)
.
(B
al
le
ta
l.
20
04
)
A
D
;E
D
;P
D
E
V
IE
W
PO
IN
T
2:
D
ES
IG
N
A
S
EX
PL
O
RA
TI
O
N
V
2 P
1
C
o-
ev
ol
ut
io
n
of
de
sig
n
pr
ob
le
m
sa
nd
so
lu
tio
ns
Th
ep
ro
ce
ss
of
de
ve
lo
pi
ng
as
ol
ut
io
n
to
ad
es
ig
n
pr
ob
le
m
w
hi
lst
sim
ul
ta
ne
ou
sly
str
uc
tu
rin
g/
re
str
uc
tu
rin
g
th
ep
ro
bl
em
.T
he
de
sig
ne
r’s
ta
sk
en
vi
ro
nm
en
ti
sc
on
sid
er
ed
to
co
m
pr
ise
of
:(
i)
ap
ro
bl
em
sp
ac
e,
en
co
m
pa
ss
in
g
kn
ow
le
dg
eo
fd
es
ig
n
re
qu
ire
m
en
ts;
an
d
(ii
)a
so
lu
tio
n
sp
ac
e,
en
co
m
pa
ss
in
g
kn
ow
le
dg
eo
fd
es
ig
n
so
lu
tio
ns
.T
he
pr
ob
le
m
sp
ac
e
se
rv
es
as
ab
as
is
to
ev
al
ua
te
id
ea
sd
ev
elo
pe
d
in
th
es
ol
ut
io
n
sp
ac
e,
w
hi
lst
th
es
ol
ut
io
n
sp
ac
ep
ro
vi
de
st
he
ba
sis
to
ev
al
ua
te
re
qu
ire
m
en
ts
ex
ist
in
g
in
th
ep
ro
bl
em
sp
ac
e.
In
te
ra
ct
io
ns
be
tw
ee
n
th
es
pa
ce
sm
ay
ad
d
ne
w
va
ria
bl
es
to
bo
th
(e
.g
.n
ew
re
qu
ire
m
en
ts
in
th
ep
ro
bl
em
sp
ac
eo
rn
ew
so
lu
tio
ns
in
th
es
ol
ut
io
n
sp
ac
e)
,t
he
re
by
ch
an
gi
ng
th
ef
oc
us
of
de
sig
ni
ng
.
(D
or
st
&
Cr
os
s2
00
1;
M
ah
er
&
Ta
ng
20
03
;
M
ah
er
&
Ki
m
20
06
;
Yu
et
al
.2
01
4)
A
D
;P
D
E
(c
on
tin
ue
d
on
ne
xt
pa
ge
)
31/42
available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/dsj.2017.6
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Glasgow Library, on 13 Sep 2017 at 11:24:36, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use,
Ta
bl
e
3.
(c
on
tin
ue
d)
V
2 P
2
Vi
su
al
re
as
on
in
g
Br
oa
dl
y
sp
ea
ki
ng
,t
he
pr
oc
es
so
fg
en
er
at
in
g
an
d
re
as
on
in
g
ab
ou
ti
de
as
w
hi
lst
en
ga
ge
d
in
sk
et
ch
in
g.
Vi
su
al
re
as
on
in
g
is
co
nc
ep
tu
al
ise
d
in
tw
o
di
ffe
re
nt
w
ay
sb
y
au
th
or
si
n
th
es
am
pl
e,
na
m
ely
as
:a
pr
oc
es
so
fs
ee
in
g
th
at
an
d
se
ei
ng
as
(V
2 P
3)
;a
nd
th
ei
nt
er
ac
tio
n
of
se
ei
ng
(V
2 P
5)
,i
m
ag
in
in
g
(V
2 P
6)
,a
nd
dr
aw
in
g
(V
2 P
7)
pr
oc
es
se
s.
(G
ol
ds
ch
m
id
t1
99
1;
Pa
rk
&
Ki
m
20
07
)
A
D
;P
D
E
V
2 P
3
Se
ei
ng
as
an
d
se
ei
ng
th
at
Tw
o
m
od
es
of
re
as
on
in
g
th
at
ad
es
ig
ne
rc
on
tin
ua
lly
sh
ift
sb
et
w
ee
n
du
rin
g
sk
et
ch
in
g
in
th
ee
ar
ly
sta
ge
so
fd
es
ig
ni
ng
:(
i)
se
ei
ng
as
,i
.e.
pr
op
os
in
g
pr
op
er
tie
s/
at
tr
ib
ut
es
th
at
ad
es
ig
n
co
ul
d
po
ss
es
sb
as
ed
on
m
et
ap
ho
rs
an
d
an
al
og
ie
s;
an
d
(ii
)s
ee
in
g
th
at
,i
.e.
de
ve
lo
pi
ng
ar
at
io
na
le
fo
rd
es
ig
n
de
ci
sio
ns
re
la
tin
g
to
th
es
ep
ro
po
sa
ls.
Re
as
on
in
g
is
dr
iv
en
by
w
ha
tt
he
de
sig
ne
rp
er
ce
iv
es
in
th
ei
rs
ke
tc
he
s,
he
nc
et
he
te
rm
vi
su
al
re
as
on
in
g
(V
2 P
2)
.
(G
ol
ds
ch
m
id
t1
99
1;
W
on
20
01
)
A
D
;P
D
E
V
2 P
4
Re
-
in
te
rp
re
ta
tio
n
Th
ep
ro
ce
ss
of
as
sig
ni
ng
ne
w
fu
nc
tio
ns
to
pa
rt
so
fa
de
sig
n
th
ro
ug
h
th
e
in
te
rp
re
ta
tio
n
of
vi
su
o-
sp
at
ia
le
le
m
en
ts
an
d
re
la
tio
ns
in
sk
et
ch
es
.
Re
-in
te
rp
re
ta
tio
n
is
cla
ss
ed
as
at
yp
eo
ff
un
ct
io
na
lc
og
ni
tiv
ea
ct
io
n
(V
2 P
8)
.
(S
uw
ae
ta
l.
19
98
,
20
00
)
A
D
V
2 P
5
Se
ei
ng
Th
ep
ro
ce
ss
of
pe
rc
ei
vi
ng
,a
na
ly
sin
g,
an
d
in
te
rp
re
tin
g
vi
su
al
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
fro
m
ex
te
rn
al
re
pr
es
en
ta
tio
ns
du
rin
g
sk
et
ch
in
g.
Se
ei
ng
is
ar
gu
ed
to
fo
rm
pa
rt
of
ad
es
ig
ne
r’s
vi
su
al
re
as
on
in
g
pr
oc
es
s,
in
te
ra
ct
in
g
w
ith
th
e
pr
oc
es
se
so
fi
m
ag
in
in
g
(V
2 P
6)
an
d
dr
aw
in
g
(V
2 P
7)
.
(P
ar
k
&
Ki
m
20
07
)
PD
E
V
2 P
6
Im
ag
in
in
g
Th
ep
ro
ce
ss
of
ge
ne
ra
tin
g
ne
w
in
te
rn
al
im
ag
es
,w
hi
ch
m
ay
be
tr
an
sfo
rm
ed
ac
co
rd
in
g
to
pa
rt
ic
ul
ar
sc
he
m
at
a(
se
eV
1 P
4)
an
d
m
ai
nt
ai
ne
d
fo
re
xt
er
na
lis
at
io
n
vi
at
he
pr
oc
es
so
fd
ra
w
in
g
(V
2 P
7)
.I
m
ag
es
m
ay
be
ge
ne
ra
te
d
us
in
g
pe
rc
ep
tu
al
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
ge
ne
ra
te
d
by
th
ep
ro
ce
ss
of
se
ei
ng
(V
2 P
5)
,a
nd
/o
rs
ch
em
at
ar
et
rie
ve
d
fro
m
lo
ng
-te
rm
m
em
or
y.
(c
on
tin
ue
d
on
ne
xt
pa
ge
)
32/42
available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/dsj.2017.6
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Glasgow Library, on 13 Sep 2017 at 11:24:36, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use,
Ta
bl
e
3.
(c
on
tin
ue
d)
V
2 P
7
D
ra
w
in
g
Th
ep
ro
ce
ss
of
ev
al
ua
tin
g
an
d
co
nf
irm
in
g
in
te
rn
al
im
ag
es
pr
od
uc
ed
th
ro
ug
h
th
ep
ro
ce
ss
of
im
ag
in
in
g
(V
2 P
6)
,b
ef
or
ee
xt
er
na
lis
in
g
th
em
(th
ro
ug
h
sk
et
ch
in
g)
to
pr
od
uc
ea
n
ex
te
rn
al
re
pr
es
en
ta
tio
n.
V
2 P
8
C
og
ni
tiv
e
ac
tio
ns
du
rin
g
sk
et
ch
in
g
A
se
to
fi
nt
er
de
pe
nd
en
tp
ro
ce
ss
es
in
vo
lv
ed
in
sk
et
ch
in
g
th
at
pe
rt
ai
n
to
se
ns
or
y
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
(p
hy
sic
al
ac
tio
ns
,V
2 P
9)
,p
er
ce
pt
ua
l(
sp
ec
ifi
ca
lly
,
vi
su
al
)i
nf
or
m
at
io
n
(p
er
ce
pt
ua
la
ct
io
ns
,V
2 P
10
),
an
d
se
m
an
tic
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
(fu
nc
tio
na
la
nd
co
nc
ep
tu
al
ac
tio
ns
,V
2 P
11
an
d
V
2 P
12
re
sp
ec
tiv
ely
).
Th
e
pr
oc
es
se
sa
re
ar
gu
ed
to
co
rr
es
po
nd
to
ba
sic
le
ve
ls
of
hu
m
an
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
pr
oc
es
sin
g.
(S
uw
ae
ta
l.
19
98
,
20
00
;K
av
ak
li
&
G
er
o
20
01
,2
00
2;
Bi
ld
a&
D
em
irk
an
20
03
;S
un
et
al
.2
01
3)
A
D
;P
D
E
V
2 P
9
Ph
ys
ic
al
ac
tio
ns
A
se
to
fp
ro
ce
ss
es
in
vo
lv
ed
in
sk
et
ch
in
g
(V
2 P
8)
th
at
pe
rt
ai
n
to
se
ns
or
y
in
fo
rm
at
io
n,
in
clu
di
ng
:(
i)
m
ak
in
g
de
pi
ct
io
ns
;a
nd
(ii
)l
oo
ki
ng
at
pr
ev
io
us
de
pi
ct
io
ns
.
V
2 P
10
Pe
rc
ep
tu
al
ac
tio
ns
A
se
to
fp
ro
ce
ss
es
in
vo
lv
ed
in
sk
et
ch
in
g
(V
2 P
8)
th
at
pe
rt
ai
n
to
pe
rc
ep
tu
al
(s
pe
ci
fic
al
ly,
vi
su
al
)i
nf
or
m
at
io
n,
in
clu
di
ng
:(
i)
at
te
nd
in
g
to
vi
su
al
fe
at
ur
es
of
sk
et
ch
ele
m
en
ts;
(ii
)a
tte
nd
in
g
to
sp
at
ia
lr
el
at
io
ns
am
on
g
ele
m
en
ts;
an
d
(ii
i)
or
ga
ni
sin
g
or
co
m
pa
rin
g
ele
m
en
ts.
V
2 P
11
Fu
nc
tio
na
l
ac
tio
ns
A
se
to
fp
ro
ce
ss
es
in
vo
lv
ed
in
sk
et
ch
in
g
(V
2 P
8)
th
at
pe
rt
ai
n
to
se
m
an
tic
(s
pe
ci
fic
al
ly,
fu
nc
tio
na
l)
in
fo
rm
at
io
n,
in
clu
di
ng
:(
i)
ex
pl
or
in
g
in
te
ra
ct
io
ns
be
tw
ee
n
ar
te
fa
ct
sa
nd
pe
op
le
/n
at
ur
e;
an
d
(ii
)c
on
sid
er
in
g
th
e
ps
yc
ho
lo
gi
ca
lr
ea
ct
io
ns
of
pe
op
le.
V
2 P
12
C
on
ce
pt
ua
l
ac
tio
ns
A
se
to
fp
ro
ce
ss
es
in
vo
lv
ed
in
sk
et
ch
in
g
(V
2 P
8)
th
at
pe
rt
ai
n
to
se
m
an
tic
(s
pe
ci
fic
al
ly,
co
nc
ep
tu
al
)i
nf
or
m
at
io
n,
in
clu
di
ng
:(
i)
pr
ef
er
en
tia
la
nd
ae
sth
et
ic
ev
al
ua
tio
n;
(ii
)s
et
tin
g
up
go
al
s;
an
d
(ii
i)
re
tr
ie
vi
ng
kn
ow
le
dg
e.
(c
on
tin
ue
d
on
ne
xt
pa
ge
)
33/42
available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/dsj.2017.6
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Glasgow Library, on 13 Sep 2017 at 11:24:36, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use,
Ta
bl
e
3.
(c
on
tin
ue
d)
V
2 P
13
U
ne
xp
ec
te
d
di
sc
ov
er
y
of
vi
su
o-
sp
at
ia
l
fe
at
ur
es
an
d
re
la
tio
ns
in
sk
et
ch
es
Th
ep
ro
ce
ss
of
pe
rc
ei
vi
ng
av
isu
o-
sp
at
ia
lf
ea
tu
re
/r
el
at
io
n
in
as
ke
tc
h
th
at
w
as
no
ti
nt
en
tio
na
lly
cr
ea
te
d
an
d
is
th
er
ef
or
eu
ne
xp
ec
te
d.
Th
re
et
yp
es
of
un
ex
pe
ct
ed
di
sc
ov
er
y
ar
ep
ro
po
se
d,
na
m
ely
di
sc
ov
er
y
of
:(
i)
th
es
ha
pe
,
siz
e,
or
te
xt
ur
eo
fa
sk
et
ch
ele
m
en
t;
(ii
)a
sp
at
ia
lo
ro
rg
an
isa
tio
na
lr
el
at
io
n
am
on
g
ele
m
en
ts;
an
d
(ii
i)
as
pa
ce
th
at
ex
ist
si
n
be
tw
ee
n
ele
m
en
ts
(fi
gu
re
-g
ro
un
d
re
ve
rs
al
).
U
ne
xp
ec
te
d
di
sc
ov
er
ie
sa
re
cla
ss
ed
as
at
yp
eo
f
pe
rc
ep
tu
al
ac
tio
n
(V
2 P
10
),
an
d
ar
ea
rg
ue
d
to
be
co
rr
el
at
ed
w
ith
th
ep
ro
ce
ss
of
sit
ua
te
d
in
ve
nt
io
n
(V
2 P
14
).
(S
uw
ae
ta
l.
20
00
;
Su
w
a2
00
3;
Yu
et
al
.
20
13
)
A
D
V
2 P
14
Si
tu
at
ed
in
ve
nt
io
n
of
de
sig
n
re
qu
ire
m
en
ts
Th
ep
ro
ce
ss
of
de
ve
lo
pi
ng
ne
w
de
sig
n
re
qu
ire
m
en
ts
ba
se
d
on
w
ha
ti
s
pe
rc
ei
ve
d
in
sk
et
ch
es
.S
itu
at
ed
in
ve
nt
io
n
of
re
qu
ire
m
en
ts
in
iti
al
ly
in
vo
lv
es
th
ed
ef
in
iti
on
of
go
al
sf
oc
us
in
g
on
ne
w
iss
ue
si
de
nt
ifi
ed
du
rin
g
sk
et
ch
in
g
(a
ty
pe
of
co
nc
ep
tu
al
ac
tio
n,
V
2 P
12
),
w
ith
th
ei
ss
ue
se
ve
nt
ua
lly
be
co
m
in
g
ge
ne
ra
le
no
ug
h
to
co
ns
tit
ut
ea
ne
w
de
sig
n
re
qu
ire
m
en
t.
Si
tu
at
ed
in
ve
nt
io
n
is
ar
gu
ed
to
be
co
rr
el
at
ed
w
ith
th
ep
ro
ce
ss
of
un
ex
pe
ct
ed
di
sc
ov
er
y
(V
2 P
13
).
V
IE
W
PO
IN
T
3:
D
ES
IG
N
AC
TI
V
IT
IE
S
V
3 P
1
Pr
ob
le
m
an
al
ys
is
Th
ep
ro
ce
ss
of
ch
ar
ac
te
ris
in
g
an
d
str
uc
tu
rin
g
th
ed
es
ig
n
pr
ob
le
m
by
se
tti
ng
go
al
sa
nd
de
fin
in
g
co
ns
tr
ai
nt
sa
nd
re
qu
ire
m
en
ts.
Pr
ob
le
m
an
al
ys
is
m
ay
be
ca
rr
ie
d
ou
ti
te
ra
tiv
ely
–
th
at
is,
th
ep
ro
bl
em
m
ay
be
re
de
fin
ed
an
d
re
str
uc
tu
re
d
du
rin
g
th
ec
ou
rs
eo
fd
es
ig
ni
ng
.
(M
cN
ei
ll
et
al
.1
99
8;
Jin
&
Ch
us
ilp
20
06
;
Kr
ug
er
&
Cr
os
s
20
06
;J
in
&
Be
na
m
i
20
10
;L
ee
et
al
.2
01
4)
A
D
;E
D
;P
D
E
V
3 P
2
M
an
ag
em
en
t
of
co
ns
tr
ai
nt
s
an
d
re
qu
ire
m
en
ts
Th
ep
ro
ce
ss
es
of
id
en
tif
yi
ng
,e
xp
lo
rin
g,
cla
rif
yi
ng
,a
nd
pr
io
rit
isi
ng
co
ns
tr
ai
nt
sa
nd
de
sig
n
re
qu
ire
m
en
ts
(in
vo
lv
ed
in
pr
ob
le
m
an
al
ys
is,
V
3 P
1)
.
(K
im
et
al
.2
00
5,
20
06
;L
an
e&
Se
er
y
20
11
;D
al
y
et
al
.
20
12
)
PD
E
(c
on
tin
ue
d
on
ne
xt
pa
ge
)
34/42
available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/dsj.2017.6
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Glasgow Library, on 13 Sep 2017 at 11:24:36, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use,
Ta
bl
e
3.
(c
on
tin
ue
d)
V
3 P
3
C
on
ce
pt
ge
ne
ra
tio
n
Th
ep
ro
ce
ss
of
ge
ne
ra
tin
g
id
ea
sf
or
so
lu
tio
ns
/p
ar
tia
ls
ol
ut
io
ns
to
de
sig
n
pr
ob
le
m
s.
Th
ef
ol
lo
w
in
g
pr
oc
es
se
sa
re
ar
gu
ed
to
be
in
vo
lv
ed
in
co
nc
ep
t
ge
ne
ra
tio
n:
(i)
m
em
or
y
re
tr
ie
va
l(
V
3 P
5)
;(
ii)
as
so
ci
at
io
n
of
m
en
ta
l
re
pr
es
en
ta
tio
ns
(V
3 P
6)
;(
iii
)t
ra
ns
fo
rm
at
io
n
of
m
en
ta
lr
ep
re
se
nt
at
io
ns
(V
3 P
7)
;a
nd
(iv
)a
na
lo
gi
ca
l(
V
3 P
8)
an
d
ca
se
-b
as
ed
re
as
on
in
g
(V
3 P
9)
.
Sy
nt
he
sis
(V
3 P
4)
m
ay
al
so
be
po
sit
io
ne
d
as
pa
rt
of
co
nc
ep
tg
en
er
at
io
n.
C
on
ce
pt
ge
ne
ra
tio
n
m
ay
be
te
rm
ed
id
ea
ge
ne
ra
tio
n
by
ce
rt
ai
n
au
th
or
s.
(Ji
n
&
Ch
us
ilp
20
06
;
Kr
ug
er
&
Cr
os
s
20
06
;J
in
&
Be
na
m
i
20
10
;L
an
e&
Se
er
y
20
11
)
ED
;P
D
E
V
3 P
4
Sy
nt
he
sis
Th
ep
ro
ce
ss
of
co
m
bi
ni
ng
an
d/
or
de
ve
lo
pi
ng
pr
ev
io
us
ly
ge
ne
ra
te
d
id
ea
s
to
pr
od
uc
em
or
em
at
ur
ec
on
ce
pt
s.
Sy
nt
he
sis
m
ay
be
tre
at
ed
ei
th
er
as
pa
rt
of
co
nc
ep
tg
en
er
at
io
n
(V
3 P
3)
,o
ra
sa
re
la
te
d
bu
td
ist
in
ct
pr
oc
es
s.
Th
e
pr
oc
es
sm
ay
be
te
rm
ed
co
nc
ep
tc
om
po
sit
io
n
by
ce
rt
ai
n
au
th
or
s.
(M
cN
ei
ll
et
al
.1
99
8;
Jin
&
Ch
us
ilp
20
06
;
Kr
ug
er
&
Cr
os
s
20
06
;D
al
y
et
al
.
20
12
)
ED
;P
D
E
V
3 P
5
Re
tr
ie
va
lo
f
re
pr
es
en
ta
tio
ns
fro
m
m
em
or
y
Th
ep
ro
ce
ss
of
re
tr
ie
vi
ng
re
pr
es
en
ta
tio
ns
fro
m
lo
ng
-te
rm
m
em
or
y
(e
.g
.
se
m
an
tic
co
nc
ep
ts
an
d
kn
ow
le
dg
eo
fp
as
td
es
ig
n
ep
iso
de
s)
.M
em
or
y
re
tr
ie
va
li
sa
rg
ue
d
to
be
af
un
da
m
en
ta
lp
ro
ce
ss
in
vo
lv
ed
in
co
nc
ep
t
ge
ne
ra
tio
n
(V
3 P
3)
.
(Ji
n
&
Be
na
m
i2
01
0;
La
ne
&
Se
er
y
20
11
)
ED
;P
D
E
V
3 P
6
A
ss
oc
ia
tio
n
of
re
pr
es
en
ta
tio
ns
Th
ep
ro
ce
ss
of
fo
rm
in
g
re
la
tio
ns
hi
ps
be
tw
ee
n
m
en
ta
lr
ep
re
se
nt
at
io
ns
re
tr
ie
ve
d
fro
m
lo
ng
-te
rm
m
em
or
y
(e
.g
.s
em
an
tic
co
nc
ep
ts
an
d
kn
ow
le
dg
e
of
pa
st
de
sig
n
ep
iso
de
s)
.A
ss
oc
ia
tio
n
is
ar
gu
ed
to
be
af
un
da
m
en
ta
l
pr
oc
es
si
nv
ol
ve
d
in
co
nc
ep
tg
en
er
at
io
n
(V
3 P
3)
,a
nd
is
vi
ew
ed
as
al
ar
ge
ly
su
bc
on
sc
io
us
,a
ut
om
at
ic
pr
oc
es
s.
(Ji
n
&
Be
na
m
i2
01
0)
ED
V
3 P
7
Tr
an
sfo
rm
at
io
n
of re
pr
es
en
ta
tio
ns
Th
ep
ro
ce
ss
of
al
te
rin
g
m
en
ta
lr
ep
re
se
nt
at
io
ns
re
tr
ie
ve
d
fro
m
lo
ng
-te
rm
m
em
or
y
(e
.g
.s
em
an
tic
co
nc
ep
ts
an
d
kn
ow
le
dg
eo
fp
as
td
es
ig
n
ep
iso
de
s)
to
pr
od
uc
en
ew
re
pr
es
en
ta
tio
ns
.T
ra
ns
fo
rm
at
io
n
is
ar
gu
ed
to
be
a
fu
nd
am
en
ta
lp
ro
ce
ss
in
vo
lv
ed
in
co
nc
ep
tg
en
er
at
io
n
(V
3 P
3)
.
(Ji
n
&
Be
na
m
i2
01
0;
La
ne
&
Se
er
y
20
11
;
Le
bl
eb
ic
i-B
as
ar
&
A
lta
rr
ib
a2
01
3)
ED
;P
D
E
(c
on
tin
ue
d
on
ne
xt
pa
ge
)
35/42
available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/dsj.2017.6
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Glasgow Library, on 13 Sep 2017 at 11:24:36, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use,
Ta
bl
e
3.
(c
on
tin
ue
d)
V
3 P
8/
V
1 P
9
A
na
lo
gi
ca
l
re
as
on
in
g
Se
eV
1 P
9
fo
rd
es
cr
ip
tio
n.
A
na
lo
gi
ca
lr
ea
so
ni
ng
ha
sb
ee
n
im
pl
ic
at
ed
in
th
e
ge
ne
ra
tio
n
(V
3 P
3)
an
d
sy
nt
he
sis
(V
3 P
4)
of
co
nc
ep
ts.
(L
iik
ka
ne
n
&
Pe
rt
tu
la
20
09
;J
in
&
Be
na
m
i2
01
0)
ED
;P
D
E
V
3 P
9/
V
1 P
10
Ca
se
-b
as
ed
re
as
on
in
g
Se
eV
1 P
10
fo
rd
es
cr
ip
tio
n.
Li
ke
an
al
og
ic
al
re
as
on
in
g
(V
3 P
8)
,c
as
e-
ba
se
d
re
as
on
in
g
ha
sb
ee
n
im
pl
ic
at
ed
in
th
eg
en
er
at
io
n
(V
3 P
3)
an
d
sy
nt
he
sis
(V
3 P
4)
of
co
nc
ep
ts.
(C
hi
u
20
03
;K
im
et
al
.2
01
0;
D
al
y
et
al
.
20
12
;K
im
&
Ry
u
20
14
;Y
u
&
G
er
o
20
15
)
A
D
;P
D
E
V
3 P
10
C
on
ce
pt
ev
al
ua
tio
n
Th
ep
ro
ce
ss
of
as
se
ss
in
g
co
nc
ep
ts
ag
ai
ns
td
es
ig
n
co
ns
tr
ai
nt
s,
re
qu
ire
m
en
ts,
an
d
ot
he
rc
rit
er
ia
to
de
te
rm
in
et
he
ex
te
nt
to
w
hi
ch
th
e
co
nc
ep
ts
fu
lfi
lt
he
cr
ite
ria
.T
he
fo
llo
w
in
g
pr
oc
es
se
sa
re
ar
gu
ed
to
be
in
vo
lv
ed
in
co
nc
ep
te
va
lu
at
io
n:
(i)
co
m
pa
rin
g
(V
3 P
11
);
an
d
(ii
)j
ud
gi
ng
(V
3 P
12
).
C
on
ce
pt
ev
al
ua
tio
n
is
al
so
clo
se
ly
re
la
te
d
to
de
ci
sio
n
m
ak
in
g
(V
3 P
13
).
(M
cN
ei
ll
et
al
.1
99
8;
Jin
&
Ch
us
ilp
20
06
;
Kr
ug
er
&
Cr
os
s
20
06
;J
in
&
Be
na
m
i
20
10
;L
ee
et
al
.2
01
4)
A
D
;E
D
;P
D
E
V
3 P
11
C
om
pa
rin
g
Th
ep
ro
ce
ss
of
co
m
pa
rin
g
co
nc
ep
ts
ag
ai
ns
td
es
ig
n
cr
ite
ria
or
ot
he
r
co
nc
ep
ts
(in
vo
lv
ed
in
co
nc
ep
te
va
lu
at
io
n,
V
3 P
10
).
(K
im
&
Ry
u
20
14
)
PD
E
V
3 P
12
Ju
dg
in
g
Th
ep
ro
ce
ss
of
m
ak
in
g
ju
dg
em
en
ts
ab
ou
tc
on
ce
pt
so
n
th
eb
as
is
of
va
lu
e,
ae
sth
et
ic
s,
aff
ec
t,
or
ob
je
ct
iv
ec
rit
er
ia
(in
vo
lv
ed
in
co
nc
ep
te
va
lu
at
io
n,
V
3 P
10
).
(C
hi
u
20
03
;K
ru
ge
r
&
Cr
os
s2
00
6;
D
al
y
et
al
.2
01
2;
Ch
an
dr
as
ek
er
ae
ta
l.
20
13
;K
im
&
Ry
u
20
14
;L
ee
et
al
.2
01
4)
A
D
;P
D
E
V
3 P
13
D
ec
isi
on
m
ak
in
g
Th
ep
ro
ce
ss
of
de
te
rm
in
in
g
w
ha
tc
on
ce
pt
(s
)s
ho
ul
d
be
ta
ke
n
fo
rw
ar
d
fo
r
fu
rt
he
rd
ev
elo
pm
en
tf
ro
m
ar
an
ge
of
al
te
rn
at
iv
es
(in
vo
lv
ed
in
co
nc
ep
t
ev
al
ua
tio
n,
V
3 P
10
).
(K
im
&
Ry
u
20
14
)
PD
E
1
D
om
ai
n
ab
br
ev
ia
tio
ns
:A
D
=
ar
ch
ite
ct
ur
al
de
sig
n;
ED
=
en
gi
ne
er
in
g
de
sig
n;
PD
E
=
pr
od
uc
td
es
ig
n
en
gi
ne
er
in
g.
36/42
available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/dsj.2017.6
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Glasgow Library, on 13 Sep 2017 at 11:24:36, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use,
a viewpoint (V) and process number (P) e.g. V1P1 (column 1). Processes are listed
and described as conveyed by investigating authors.
It should be highlighted that several processes presented in Table 3 involve
multiple related processes, as conveyed in the process descriptions presented
in column 3. We adopted the organisation and structure of Table 3 largely
because it aligns with the manner in which processes are discussed by the
authors investigating them. In turn, we found it to be the most conducive to
clear explanation of the review findings. Nonetheless, we acknowledge that other
authors may have different interpretations in this respect.
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